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Article 1

ARTICLES

Th e Dialogic Prom ise
ASSESSING THE NORMATIVE POTENTIAL OF
THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE
Christine Bateup†
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recen t years, “dialogue” h as becom e an in creasin gly
ubiquitous m etaph or w ith in constitution al th eory. It is m ost
com m on ly used to describe th e n ature of in teractions betw een
courts an d th e political bran ch es of govern m en t in th e area of
con stitution al decision-m akin g, particularly in relation to th e
in terpretation of constitution al righ ts.
Dialogue th eories
em ph asize th at th e judiciary does n ot (as an em pirical m atter)
n or sh ould n ot (as a norm ative m atter) h ave a m on opoly on
con stitution al in terpretation. Rath er, w h en exercisin g the
pow er of judicial review , judges en gage in an in teractive,
in tercon nected
an d
dialectical
con versation
about
con stitution al m ean in g. In sh ort, con stitution al judgm en ts are,
or ideally sh ould be, produced th rough a process of sh ared
elaboration betw een th e judiciary an d oth er con stitution al
actors.
Th eories of constitution al dialogue h ave proliferated in
recen t tim es because of th e poten tial th at m any see in th em to
resolve th e dem ocratic legitim acy concerns associated w ith
†
Hauser Research Scholar an d J.S.D. Can didate, New York Un iversity
Sch ool of Law ; Freda Bage Fellow , Australian Federation of Un iversity Wom en (Q ld.).
Th an ks to Dario Castiglion e, Neal Devin s, Paul Dim on d, Victor Ferreres Com ella, Lou
Fisher, Barry Friedm an , Janet Hiebert, Tsvi Kah an a, Mich ael Perry, Ken t Roach , Yair
Sagy, Ch eryl Saun ders, Mark Tush net an d David Z arin g for their valuable com m en ts
an d th ough tful feedback.
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judicial review . With in con stitution al th eory, con tem porary
sch olars h ave ten ded to fixate upon fin din g an objective th eory
of in terpretation th at provides an appropriate m eth odology for
judges to follow w h en in terpretin g constitution al provision s in
order to en h ance th eir legitim acy. Th eories of con stitution al
dialogue offer an altern ative w ay of fillin g th e legitim acy
lacun a, because if the political bran ches of govern m en t an d th e
people are able to respon d to judicial decision s in a dialogic
fash ion, th e force of th e coun term ajoritarian difficulty is
Of
overcom e, or at th e very least, greatly atten uated.1
particular in terest, m an y th eories claim th at dialogue betw een
th e judiciary an d other con stitution al actors is a structural
feature of the Un ited States constitution al system . Th is w ould
appear to alleviate m uch of th e an xiety about judicial review
th at is expressed by popular constitution alists, w h o call for a
reassertion of th e Am erican h istorical tradition of th e
in volvem en t of th e People in constitution al in terpretation .2
Dialogue th eorists, in con trast, assert th at th is in volvem ent
already occurs.3
If an yth in g, th eories of con stitution al dialogue are even
m ore w idespread outside th e United States. Th e con cept of
dialogue h as been popularized to th e greatest exten t in
coun tries, such as Can ada,4 w h ich h ave m ore recen tly adopted
1

Cf. Mich ael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterm inacy and Institutional D esign, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 978 (2003) (advocatin g “dem ocratic experim en talism ” in
in stitution al design , rather than turn in g to constitution al dialogue, as a w ay of
resolving dem ocratic legitim acy concern s).
2
See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 208 (2004) [h erein after KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES] (“Bear in m in d th at popular con stitution alism never den ied
courts the pow er of judicial review : it den ied on ly th at judges had fin al say.”); MARK
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 174 (1999) [h erein after
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION] (“Populist con stitution al law seeks to distribute
con stitution al respon sibility th roughout the population .”); Larry D. Kram er, W e the
Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 13-14 (2001) (supportin g a system of popular
con stitution alism in w h ich the executive an d legislative bran ch es of govern m en t, as
agen ts of the people, h ave an equal role to th e Court in con stitution al in terpretation
an d im plem en tation ).
3
See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism ,
D epartm entalism , and Judicial Suprem acy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1041-42 (2004)
[h erein after Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism ] (critiquin g Kram er’s approach
to popular con stitution alism from a dialogic perspective).
4
See generally KENT ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM OR DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE (2001) [h erein after ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT
ON TRIAL]; Kent Roach, Constitutional and Com m on Law D ialogues Betw een the
Suprem e Court and Canadian Legislatures, 80 CAN. B. REV. 481 (2001) [h erein after
Roach, D ialogues]; Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The Ch arter D ialogue Betw een
Courts and Legislatures (O r Perhaps the Ch arter of Righ ts Isn’t Such a Bad Thing
A fter A ll), 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75 (1997) [h erein after Hogg & Bush ell, D ialogue].
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Bills of Righ ts.5 Sch olars frequen tly state th at th ese “m odern”
or “w eak form ” Bills of Righ ts con tem plate dialogue, due to th e
fact th at th ey con tain deliberate m ech an ism s en ablin g
legislative respon ses to judicial decisions about righ ts.$ In th is
con text, n ot only does con ceivin g of con stitution alism as
in volvin g a dialogue betw een courts an d th e political bran ch es
of govern m en t tem per con cerns about th e dem ocratic deficit of
judicial review , but it also en ables th e in n ovative in stitution al
features of th ese Bills of Righ ts to be better in corporated in to
n orm ative constitution al th eory.
Th is article provides a critical accoun t of th eories of
con stitution al dialogue in order to determ in e w h ich of th ese
th eories h old th e greatest n orm ative prom ise. Th is requires
an sw erin g tw o separate questions. Th e first is w h eth er
th eories of constitutional dialogue are able to accom plish th eir
goal of resolvin g th e dem ocratic objection to judicial review .
Th e secon d is w h eth er, legitim acy aside, th e differen t th eories
provide an attractive n orm ative vision of the role of judicial
review in dem ocratic con stitution alism .
Th e an sw ers to th ese question s vary depen din g on
w h eth er th e th eories are prin cipally positive or n orm ative, and
on th e specific dialogic role th at is ascribed to th e judiciary. As
a gen eral m atter, th e m ore prescriptive th e th eory, th e less
likely it is to address legitim acy concerns adequately. Because
5

See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum , The N ew Com m onw ealth M odel of
Constitutionalism , 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707, 710 (2001) (arguin g th at the con stitution al
an d statutory bills of righ ts adopted in Can ada, New Zealan d an d th e Un ited Kin gdom
attem pt to create “join t respon sibility . . . an d deliberative dialogue betw een courts an d
legislatures”); C.A. Gearty, R econciling Parliam entary D em ocracy and H um an R ights,
118 LAW Q . REV. 248, 248-49 (2002) (arguin g th at a sign ifican t feature of th e Un ited
Kin gdom Hum an Righ ts Act is th e poten tial dialogic ten sion it creates betw een the
legislature an d the judiciary); Tom
R. Hickm an, Constitutional D ialogue,
Constitutional Theories and the H um an R ights Act 1998, 2005 PUB. L. 30$, 307 (U.K.)
(arguin g th at a “stron g form ” version of dialogue best reflects the form of
con stitution alism em bodied in th e Un ited Kin gdom Hum an Righ ts Act). In European
coun tries w ith cen tralized system s of judicial review , the n otion of con stitution al
dialogue h as also been used to explain the relation sh ip betw een con stitution al courts
an d th e political branch es of govern m en t. See, e.g., ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING
WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE 22, 92 (2000); Alec Stone Sw eet,
Constitutional D ialogues: Protecting R ights in Xrance, G erm any, Italy & Spain, in
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 8, 8 (Sally J. Ken ney et al.
eds., 1999).
$
See, e.g., San dra Fredm an , Judging D em ocracy: The R ole of the Judiciary
under the H R A 1998, 53 CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 99, 119 (2000) (arguin g th at due to the
fact th at th e fin al w ord about the in terpretation of righ ts un der th e Hum an Righ ts Act
rem ain s w ith the legislature, “a dialogue of sorts is set up betw een the courts an d
Parliam ent”); Ken t Roach , D ialogic JudicialR eview and Its Critics, 23 SUP. CT. L. REV.
49, 49 (2004) [h erein after Roach , D ialogic JudicialR eview ] (claim in g th at the structure
of the Can adian Ch arter “con tem plates an d in vites dialogue”).
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prescriptive th eories ten d to privilege th e role of judges in
con stitution al decision -m akin g, w ith out sufficien t reason, an d
leave lim ited space for in dependen t political judgm en ts, th ey
fail to provide a satisfactory answ er to legitim acy con cerns.
Positive accoun ts, on th e oth er h and, often provide m ore
persuasive
eviden ce
th at
concern
about
th e
coun term ajoritarian difficulty is overstated. How ever, th ese
accoun ts th em selves are subject to criticism , as th ey frequently
fail to offer an attractive n orm ative vision of w h at judicial
review sh ould accom plish in m odern society.
Th is article argues that th e m ost prom isin g positive
th eories are “equilibrium ” and “partnersh ip” theories of
con stitution al dialogue. Equilibrium th eories focus on th e
judiciary’s capacity to facilitate society-w ide con stitution al
debate, w h ile partn ersh ip th eories draw atten tion to m ore
distin ct “judicial” an d “legislative” fun ction s th at th e different
bran ch es of governm ent respectively perform . Th ese th eories
h ave con siderable n orm ative poten tial because th ey provide
attractive explan ation s of th e judicial role in dialogue th at do
n ot privilege th e contribution s of judges. In order to provide
th e m ost satisfyin g n orm ative accoun t of th e role of judicial
review in m odern con stitution alism , th is article con cludes th at
equilibrium and partnersh ip th eories sh ould be syn th esized,
creatin g dialogic fusion. Th is w ill n ot on ly produce a vision of
dialogue th at effectively accoun ts for th e differen t roles th at
th e various participan ts can play in th e elaboration of
con stitution al m ean ing, but it w ill also en able a m ore
com preh ensive un derstan din g of th e differen t in stitution al an d
social aspects of constitution al dialogue.
Part II of th is article explain s th e em ergen ce of th eories
of con stitution al dialogue in con tem porary sch olarsh ip,
con n ectin g th is to th eir perceived ability to resolve m an y of the
dem ocratic legitim acy con cern s associated w ith judicial review .
Part III provides a typology of th e differin g th eories of dialogue,
assessin g each in term s of its ability to (a) address th e
dem ocratic legitim acy con cern s associated w ith judicial review ,
an d (b) provide a n orm atively attractive accoun t of th e role of
judicial review .7 Alth ough th eories of dialogue aboun d, n o
7

Th e focus here w ill be on theories of con stitution al dialogue th at h ave
em erged in the Un ited States an d Can ada. Alth ough th is necessarily excludes a sm all
am oun t of literature from other n ation s, the theories th at h ave em erged in th ese tw o
coun tries are by far the richest th eories of dialogue th at h ave been proposed an d
provide a fairly com plete review of th e range of features th at a th eory of con stitution al
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sch olar to date has attem pted to categorize th em
com preh ensively, explain in g th e im portan t w ays in w h ich th e
various accoun ts both con verge an d differ. Part IV th en
explores h ow a dialogic fusion betw een equilibrium an d
partn ersh ip m odels both satisfies con cern s about th e
coun term ajoritarian difficulty and offers an attractive
n orm ative vision of con stitution al dialogue, as w ell as
proposin g a ran ge of directions for future research .
II.

THE EMERGENCE OF THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DIALOGUE

Norm ative con stitution al th eory h as lon g been
dom in ated by con cerns th at judicial review is incom patible
w ith dem ocracy. In th e Un ited States, th e issue h as concern ed
sch olars at least sin ce Th ayer fam ously argued, in 1893, th at
judicial review
debilitates th e political bran ch es of
govern m en t.8 In th e 19$0s, Bickel labeled th e in con sistency of
judicial review w ith dem ocracy th e “coun term ajoritarian
difficulty.”9 Sin ce Bickel, th e question of th e dem ocratic
legitim acy of judicial review h as oversh adow ed all oth er
th eoretical in quiries
w ith in
n orm ative
con stitution al
10
sch olarsh ip. Wh ile th is “obsession ” is m ost apparent w ith in
Am erican constitution al th eory, due both to the len gth y h istory
of judicial review in th e Un ited States and th e passion ate
political an d legal con troversies th at th e exercise of this pow er
by th e judiciary h as en gen dered, con cern about recon cilin g
dialogue m ay h ave. A differen t objection th at m igh t be raised con cern in g th is
m eth odology relates to the differen t con stitution al provisions an d structures of the
Un ited States Con stitution an d th e Can adian Ch arter of Righ ts an d Freedom s, w h ich
m an y com m en tators h ave argued affect the n ature of th e dialogic in teractions th at
occur in those system s. Even acceptin g th is is true, there nonetheless rem ain s value in
takin g a step back from th ese distin ct structural provisions in order to com pare the
n orm ative an d prescriptive in sigh ts th at differen t th eories of con stitution al dialogue
provide.
8
Jam es B. Th ayer, The O rigin and Scope of the Am erican D octrine of
ConstitutionalLaw , 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 15$ (1893).
9
ALEX ANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 1$ (19$2) [h erein after BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH]; see also Barry Friedm an , The H istory of the Counterm ajoritarian D ifficulty,
Part O ne: The R oad to Judicial Suprem acy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 334 (1998) (“Th e
‘coun term ajoritarian difficulty’ has been the cen tral obsession of m odern con stitution al
sch olarsh ip.”).
10
In relation to the h istory of concern s about th e coun term ajoritarian
difficulty in th e Un ited States, see gen erally Barry Friedm an , The Birth of an
A cadem ic O bsession: The H istory of the Counterm ajoritarian D ifficulty, Part Xive, 112
YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
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judicial auth ority w ith dem ocratic th eory also an im ates
con stitution al discussion in a ran ge of oth er n ation s.11
Con ven tion al
attem pts
to
resolve
th e
coun term ajoritarian difficulty, both in the Un ited States and in
oth er n ations, h ave centered on proposin g objective th eories of
con stitution al in terpretation in order to appropriately confin e
judicial discretion . This Part exam in es w h y th ese attem pts
h ave failed to alleviate coun term ajoritarian con cern s. It th en
in troduces dialogue theory’s n ovel solution to th is vexin g issue.
A.

The D em ocratic D eficit ofJudicialR eview and the
Xailure ofContem porary ConstitutionalTheory

Wh en exam in in g w h y judicial review is com m on ly
regarded as in com patible w ith dem ocracy, it is h elpful to
return to Bickel’s description of th e problem in The Least
D angerous Branch. Bickel w as concern ed that w h en judges
strike dow n legislation , th ey “th w art the w ill” of th e prevailin g
political m ajority.12
Alth ough Bickel recognized th at th e
political institutions of govern m en t often are n ot perfectly
m ajoritarian an d th at judicial review m ay h ave w ays of bein g
respon sive to m ajority con cern s, h e n on eth eless argued th at
th ere rem ains “a serious conflict w ith dem ocratic th eory” due to
th e fact th at judges are un elected an d their constitution al
decision s are not reversible by an y legislative m ajority.13
Judicial review is a “devian t institution in th e Am erican
dem ocracy” precisely because judges, w h o are n ot electorally
accoun table for th eir action s, are able to strike dow n legislation
th at h as been en acted by th ose w h o represen t th e w ill of the
people.14
Con cern s about th e legitim acy of judges in validatin g
legislation becom e even starker in relation to judicial decisions
about th e in terpretation of con stitution al righ ts. Th is is
because th e in determ inate n ature of righ ts leads to pervasive
yet reason able disagreem en t about h ow righ ts sh ould be
con ceived, h ow they should be applied in specific con texts, and

11
For scholarly w ork th at raises concern s about the coun term ajoritarian
difficulty in th e Can adian con text, see ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, WAITING FOR CORAF 5787 (1995); F.L. MORTON & RAINER KNOPFF, THE CHARTER REVOLUTION AND THE COURT
PARTY 1$$ (2000).
12
See BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 9, at 1$-17.
13
Id. at 17-20.
14
Id. at 18.
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w h at oth er values, if an y, ough t to trum p th em .15 In th e
con text of such fun dam en tal disagreem en t, it is question able
w h eth er it is possible to reach “correct” answ ers about these
issues.1$ As a result, m an y n ow question w h y judges should be
allow ed to m ake fin al an d bin din g decision s about th e force or
m ean in g of righ ts, or w h eth er such question s sh ould instead be
left to m ore dem ocratic an d in clusive processes for deliberation
an d resolution .
In th e face of th e in determ in acy of
con stitution al righ ts, it also rem ain s unclear w h at tech n iques
or m eth odology judges sh ould use to in terpret th em .
In addition to th eir concern about judges thw artin g th e
w ill of prevailin g political m ajorities, Th ayer an d Bickel w ere
un easy about oth er dem ocratic costs associated w ith th e
practice of judicial review . Th ayer feared th at judicial review
en courages legislators to defer to judicial statem ents about
righ ts rath er th an to en gage in in depen dent con sideration of
th e m ean in g of con stitution al values.17 Ech oin g Th ayer, Bickel
com m en ted th at “[b]esides bein g a coun ter-m ajoritarian ch eck
on th e legislature an d th e executive, judicial review m ay, in a
larger sen se, h ave a ten den cy over tim e seriously to w eaken
th e dem ocratic process.”18 More recen tly, Mark Tush n et h as
defin ed these problem s as “policy distortion” an d “dem ocratic
debilitation .”19 Judicial review can lead to policy distortion
w h en legislatures ch oose policies based on w h at judges h ave
said about constitution al n orm s, rather th an m akin g
in dependen t judgm en ts about w h at th e Constitution requires
15
See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 11-12, 2$8 (1999); Rich ard
Pildes, W hy R ights are N ot Trum ps: Social M eanings, E xpressive H arm s, and
Constitutionalism , 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); see also AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS
THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 1 (199$) (statin g th at reason able
disagreem en t is an un avoidable feature of both politics an d law ); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35 (199$) (discussin g the ch allen ges th at
face th e judiciary in the face of reason able disagreem en t).
1$
Recogn ition of th is poin t need n ot equate w ith m oral relativism , just an
acknow ledgem en t th at even if righ t an sw ers exist, the phenom en on of reason able
disagreem en t m ean s th at w e m ay n ot be able to readily iden tify th ese an sw ers. In
relation to th is issue, see WALDRON, supra n ote 15, passim ; Rich ard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Im plem enting the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 58 n .12 (1997).
17
Th ayer, supra note 8, at 155-5$ (statin g th at judicial review “h as h ad a
ten den cy to drive out question s of justice an d righ t, an d to fill th e m in d of legislators
w ith th ough ts of m ere legality . . . [a]n d m oreover, even in th e m atter of legality, they
h ave felt little respon sibility; if w e are w ron g, th ey say, the courts w ill correct it”).
18
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 9, at 21.
19
Mark Tush net, Policy D istortion and D em ocratic D ebilitation:Com parative
Illum ination ofthe Counterm ajoritarian D ifficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 245, 247, 259, 275
[h erein after Tush net, Policy D istortion]; see also TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 2, at 57-$3.
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in particular cases. Dem ocratic debilitation , in con trast, occurs
w h en legislatures en act statutes w ithout discussin g
con stitution al n orm s, in stead relyin g on th e courts to con sider
con stitution al problem s w ith legislation .
Respon din g to th ese con cern s, con tem porary sch olarship
h as en deavored to form ulate an objective th eory of
con stitution al in terpretation th at both clearly defin es a sph ere
w ith in w hich judicial resolution of con stitution al issues is
dem ocratically appropriate, an d w h ich provides an appropriate
m eth odology for judges to follow in the face of in determ in ate
con stitution al provision s.
At on e en d of th e spectrum ,
origin alists argue th at judges sh ould con fine th em selves to
con sideration of th e origin al in ten tion of th e Fram ers w h en
decidin g constitution al cases, in order to give effect to th e
en durin g values of th e People as expressed in th e Con stitution
itself.20 Oth ers suggest th at a m ore substantive approach to
in terpretation is required so th at judges can address th e
fun dam en tal m oral values th at are em bodied in th e
Con stitution .21
Restin g on stron ger claim s about judicial
expertise in relation to m oral principle, th ese “fundam ental
righ ts” th eories focus less on justifyin g judicial review as
dem ocratically legitim ate th an on stressin g th at excessive
con cern w ith th is question leads to a w eaken in g of th e
judiciary’s vital fun ction of elaboratin g the prin cipled basis of
th e Con stitution . A furth er in fluential th eory is Joh n Hart
Ely’s “represen tation -rein forcin g” th eory of judicial review .22
Ely asserts th at judicial review can on ly be justified w h en th e
judiciary acts to identify an d correct m alfun ction s in th e
political process.
Represen tation -rein forcin g th eory th us
20
Differin g con ception s of origin alism h ave been proposed. See, e.g., RAOUL
BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN $-20, 193-200 (1987); ROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 143-$0 (1990);
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW vii,
23-25 (1997).
21
Ron ald Dw orkin does n ot see judicial review as presen ting dem ocratic
legitim acy problem s, because th e w hole poin t of th e Con stitution is to protect
in dividuals from m ajorities. See, e.g., RONALD M. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
57-$0, 88, 110-11 (1985); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131-49 (1977).
In Can ada, fun dam en tal righ ts th eory un der the Can adian Charter is supported by
Lorraine Weinrib. See, e.g., Lorraine Eisen stat Wein rib, Canada’s Constitutional
R evolution: Xrom Legislative to Constitutional State, 33 ISR. L. REV. 13, 15, 23-2$, 4348 (1999).
22
See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). In
Can ada, sim ilar argum ents h ave been m ade by Mon ah an, relyin g on Ely. See Patrick
J. Mon ah an , Judicial R eview and D em ocracy: A Theory of Judicial R eview , 21 U.B.C.
L. REV. 87, 90 (1987).
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con fin es th e judicial role to im provin g or perfectin g th e
dem ocratic process, rath er th an th e vin dication of substan tive
con stitution al values.
Exten sive sch olarly criticism h as revealed n um erous
failin gs w ith each of th ese th eories, h igh lightin g eith er th at
objective con strain ts on th e judiciary do n ot exist, or at th e very
least, th at th ese th eories h ave failed to identify legal prin ciples
th at place effective constrain ts on judges. Take origin alism , for
exam ple, w h ich h as been w idely critiqued as un realistic an d
un w orkable. Even if on e accepted th at it is appropriate to
revert to th e inten tion of th e Fram ers in th e event of
am biguity, w h ich is high ly con ten tious, it is im possible to
accurately determ in e th e Fram ers’ view s in relation to m ost
con stitution al provision s.23 Turn in g to fundam en tal righ ts
th eory, its’ claim s th at judges h ave special abilities in relation
to questions of m oral prin ciple h ave also been criticized as
un realistic, given th e in determ in ate n ature of righ ts. In
addition , even if it is accepted th at righ t answ ers exist to th ese
questions, n o consensus is possible about h ow judges can
actually iden tify th ese an sw ers.24 Represen tation -rein forcing
th eory is also flaw ed as it is question able w heth er judges can
really refrain from m akin g substan tive value ch oices, as Ely
asserts. More im portan tly, given th at th e Un ited States
Con stitution protects substan tive as w ell as procedural righ ts,
Ely is un successful in dem onstratin g th at th e Con stitution
privileges th e values of th e dem ocratic process over th ese
substan tive com m itm en ts.25 Despite th ese theorists’ efforts,
objective th eories of in terpretation h ave failed to ach ieve th eir
goal of successfully resolvin g th e coun term ajoritarian difficulty.

23

See, e.g., Paul Brest, The M isconceived Q uest for the O riginal
U nderstanding, $0 B.U. L. REV. 204, 205, 229-31, 238 (1980) (arguin g th at origin alism
fails to provide a sen sible or realistic strategy for con stitution al in terpretation );
DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 21, at 33-71.
24
See, e.g., WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 15, at 180-83;
Paul Brest, The Xundam ental R ights Controversy: The E ssential Contradictions of
N orm ative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 10$3, 1089 (1981) (“Even
assum ing th at gen eral principles can be foun d in social con sen sus or derived by m oral
reason ing, the application of those prin ciples is h igh ly in determ in ate an d subject to
m an ipulation .”).
25
For criticism of Ely’s theory, see, for exam ple, Dw orkin, The Xorum of
Principle, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 21, at 58-$9; Lauren ce Tribe, The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 10$3, 10$4
(1980) (arguin g th at represen tation -rein forcin g theory is “radically in determ in ate an d
fun dam en tally in com plete”).
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The Turn to D ialogue

Given th e difficulties en coun tered by oth er approach es,
it is n ot surprisin g th at th eories of constitutional dialogue h ave
em erged as on e of the prin cipal con tenders in th e quest for a
satisfactory th eory of judicial auth ority in con stitution al
decision -m akin g. In con trast to th eories of in terpretation ,
w h ich propose in terpretive criteria th at judges sh ould use in
con stitution al cases, dialogue th eories focus on th e in stitution al
process through w h ich decision s about con stitution al m ean in g
are m ade, suggestin g th at th is in volves th e shared elaboration
of constitution al m eanin g betw een th e judiciary an d oth er
actors.
Th is approach h olds th e potential to resolve
coun term ajoritarian con cern s because of its recogn ition th at
n on -judicial actors play a key role in con stitution al
in terpretation . Specifically, th e con cern s th at judicial review
n ecessarily sets judges against th e electorally accoun table
bran ch es of govern m ent are greatly atten uated if th e political
bran ch es are able to respond to judicial decision s w ith w hich
th ey disagree.2$
In proposin g th is resolution to th e counterm ajoritarian
difficulty, th eories of con stitution al dialogue are allied w ith
sch olarsh ip w ith in th e social sciences that suggest judicial
review is n ot, in fact, coun term ajoritarian . As n oted above, on e
of th e key prem ises of th e coun term ajoritarian difficulty is th at
it is dem ocratically illegitim ate for un elected an d
un represen tative judges to th w art th e w ill of th e prevailin g
political m ajority. Th is prem ise rests on the assum ption th at
w h en judges strike dow n legislation , th eir decisions are fin al,
w h ich is w h at serves to trum p m ajority w ill.27 Social scien tists
studyin g judicial beh avior h ave in creasin gly dem on strated,
h ow ever, th at th e assum ption of judicial fin ality is in correct.
With respect to con stitution al decision s of th e Suprem e Court,
w h ile a judicial decision is fin al in the sense th at it bin ds th e
parties to th e action,28 it is rarely th e fin al w ord in relation to
th e broader constitution al issues bein g considered due to a
2$

See, e.g., Roach, D ialogues, supra n ote 4, at 532 (“Un der a dialogic
approach, th e dilem m a of judicial activism in a dem ocracy dim in ish es perh aps to th e
poin t of evaporation .”).
27
See Barry Friedm an , D ialogue and Judicial R eview , 91 MICH. L. REV. 577,
$28-29, $43-53 (1993) [h erein after Friedm an, D ialogue].
28
En forcem en t is n ot autom atic, so in th is sen se it could be said that judicial
decrees do not necessarily constitute th e fin al w ord in a particular case. See id. at $4345 & n n .334 & 337-42.
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variety of institution al an d political constrain ts on th e Court.29
For exam ple, com pliance w ith Suprem e Court decisions is n ot
guaran teed, but is depen den t on political support an d
volun tary obedien ce.30 In addition , th e political bran ch es of
govern m en t can, an d frequen tly do, ch allen ge judicial decision s
by en actin g new legislation th at tests or attem pts to restrict
court rulin gs.31 In th e even t of vigorous disagreem en t, the
political bran ch es of govern m en t also h ave th e option of
pun ish in g, or th reatenin g to pun ish, th e Court. Th e use of
th ese tech n iques m ay th en prom pt th e Court to revise or
overturn its prior decision s.32 Given th e existen ce of th ese
in stitution al con strain ts th at serve to keep judicial decision s
w ith in dem ocratic lim its, th e overw h elm in g relian ce on
objective interpretative th eories in constitution al sch olarship
th us appears to be m isplaced.
Th e th eoretical ch allen ge th at th is em pirical in sigh t
poses to con vention al debates about th e coun term ajoritarian
difficulty h as arisen even m ore starkly in coun tries w h ere
structural constitution al provisions explicitly give th e political
bran ch es of govern m en t th e ability to override judicial
decision s. On e of th e m ost n otable features of th e Can adian
Ch arter is th e “override” or “notw ithstandin g” provision
con tain ed in section 33, w h ich gran ts pow er to th e Can adian
legislatures at both th e provin cial an d federal levels to deviate
from or displace m ost judicial in terpretation s of Ch arter
righ ts.33 Th e n egotiators of th e Ch arter con sidered th at th is
29
See, e.g., NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
230-33 (2004) (listin g ten qualification s to the “last w ord doctrin e”).
30
See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE 30-3$ (1991) (discussin g th e lim ited ability of courts to ach ieve
social ch an ge w ithout popular support); Mich ael J. Klarm an, H ow Brow n Changed
R ace R elations:The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81, 81, 85 (1994) (describin g how
Brow n v. Board of E ducation caused social ch an ge prim arily th rough in direct m ean s);
see also MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQ UALITY 310-11 (2004).
31
See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS
POLITICAL PROCESS 20$-09 (1988) (providin g exam ples of situation s w here Con gress
h as passed new law s in ligh t of negative judicial decision s).
32
Even if these tech n iques are not used, th e Court m igh t nonetheless m odify
its beh avior to avoid a poten tial attack. See TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A
POLITICAL COURT 145-4$ (1999) (discussin g the “rule of an ticipated reaction s”).
33
Certain Ch arter righ ts can not be overridden by legislatures, such as
m inority lan guage righ ts. Can adian Ch arter of Righ ts an d Freedom s, §§ 23, 33(1),
Part I of the Con stitution Act, 1982, Being Schedule B to the Can ada Act, 1982, ch. 11
(U.K.). There are also structural con strain ts on legislative use of th e override. First,
th e legislature m ust expressly declare th at the legislation w ill operate notw ith stan din g
certain Ch arter righ ts. Secon d, as an y override expires five years after it is en acted,
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provision w ould overcom e th e dem ocratic deficit of judicial
review , as it provides a “constitution al escape valve” th at
legislatures can use to “correct” judicial decision s w ith w h ich
th ey disagree.34 Furth er opportun ity for political response is
provided by section 1 of th e Ch arter, a gen eral lim itation
provision th at specifies th at Ch arter righ ts are subject to “such
reason able lim its prescribed by law as can be dem onstrably
justified in a free and dem ocratic society.”35 Not on ly does th is
provision allow governm en ts to defend statutory provision s as
“reason able lim its” on Ch arter righ ts, but it also provides
legislatures w ith the opportun ity to respon d to th e judicial
in validation of statutory provision s by devising legislation th at
pursues th e sam e objectives by less restrictive m ean s. Th ere is
som e disagreem en t about h ow effective th ese provision s h ave
been in providin g for political recon sideration of judicial
decision s, particularly given th at th e override h as rarely been
em ployed by Can adian legislatures.3$
Non eth eless, the
existen ce of these m ech an ism s h as also prom pted
con stitution al th eorists in Can ada to en gage in th e search for
n ew w ays to reconcile judicial authority w ith dem ocratic
th eory, w ith m an y turnin g to dialogue th eories as part of th is
quest.
Th e first question th at m ust be addressed in evaluatin g
th e n orm ative prom ise of th eories of con stitution al dialogue is
w h eth er they successfully resolve th e coun term ajoritarian
difficulty, as their various propon ents assert. Th e an sw er to
th is question largely turn s on w h ether th e th eories are
th e legislature m ust explicitly reen act the m easure every five years if it w an ts the
override to con tin ue in force. Id. §§ 3-5.
34
Sujit Choudh ry, The Lochner E ra and Com parative Constitutionalism , 2
INT’L J. CONST. L. (I.CON) 1, 45 (2004). Wh ile th is legislative h istory suggests th at the
override w as in ten ded to be used on ly subsequen t to a judicial decision , it h as been
used preem ptively on a n um ber of occasion s. See Tsvi Kah an a, The N otw ithstanding
M echanism and Public D iscussion: Lessons from the Ignored Practice of Section 33 of
the Charter, 44 CAN. PUB. ADMIN. 255, 25$ (2001) [h erein after Kah an a, The
N otw ithstanding M echanism ].
35
Th e full text of section 1 is: “The Can adian Ch arter of Righ ts an d
Freedom s guaran tees th e righ ts an d freedom s set out in it subject on ly to such
reason able lim its prescribed by law as can be dem on strably justified in a free an d
dem ocratic society.” Can adian Ch arter of Righ ts an d Freedom s, §1, Part I of th e
Con stitution Act, 1982, Being Sch edule B to the Can ada Act, 1982, ch . 11 (U.K.).
3$
Com pare CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, JUDICIAL POWER AND THE CHARTER 4
(2d ed., 2001) (arguin g th at lack of legislative use of the override h as led to the
con tin ued grow th of judicial pow er in Can ada), w ith Kah an a, The N otw ithstanding
M echanism , supra n ote 34, at 255 (arguin g th at w h ile th e override could be m ore
effectively used by legislatures, it h as in fact been em ployed m ore often th an is
com m on ly recogn ized).
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prin cipally descriptive (positive) or prescriptive. Alth ough
m ost th eories of dialogue resist rigid categorization on th ese
term s, due to th e fact that positive th eories con tain prescriptive
elem en ts an d vice versa, placin g th em along th is axis does
reveal im portant distinction s.37 At on e en d of the spectrum are
th eories of dialogue that seek to provide a positive accoun t of
th e in stitution al con text in w h ich the differen t bran ches of
govern m en t operate, developin g th eir n orm ative in sigh ts on
th e basis of th is description. Movin g alon g th e axis, w e fin d
th eories th at begin w ith explicit recogn ition of th e fact th at
judicial decisions n eed n ot be fin al, but focus to a greater
exten t on proposin g a prescriptive vision of how constitution al
dialogue sh ould proceed based on th is positive fact. At th e
opposite en d of the spectrum lie th eories of dialogue th at
esch ew a clear focus on positive dyn am ics, in stead providin g
h eavily prescriptive accoun ts of h ow a dialogic system should
operate un der ideal circum stances.
Th ese distinctions h ave im portan t con sequen ces for
w h eth er different th eories are able to overcom e con cerns about
th e dem ocratic legitim acy of judicial review . If th e political
bran ch es of governm ent an d oth er social actors are indeed able
to respon d to judicial decisions about th e m ean in g of th e
Con stitution , as h igh ligh ted by th e m ore positive th eories, th en
con cerns about th e dem ocratic legitim acy of judicial review are
greatly reduced.
How ever, to th e extent th at dialogic
in teraction s do n ot operate in practice, but are rath er view ed as
a n orm ative ideal, a differen t kind of an alysis m ust be
un dertaken .
Th e success of th ese th eories in resolvin g
coun term ajoritarian con cern s w ill vary accordin g to w h ether
th e judicial role in con stitution al decision-m akin g is privileged,
w ith out sufficient reason , an d w h eth er sufficien t space is left
for in depen dent political judgm ent.
Beyon d legitim acy concern s, th eories of constitution al
dialogue m ust be able to stan d on their ow n n orm ative w orth .
How ever, th eories of dialogue tend to fall sh ort on the
n orm ative level in tw o distin ct w ays. The m ost h eavily
prescriptive th eories ten d to fail because th ey are n ot
sufficiently groun ded in h ow judicial review operates in th e
real w orld. In oth er w ords, even if th ey provide an attractive
prescriptive explan ation of th e role th at courts should play in
37
See, e.g., Rich ard H. Fallon , Jr., H ow to Choose a ConstitutionalTheory, 87
CAL. L. REV. 535, 540-41 (1999) (suggestin g th at con stitution al theories are resistan t to
strict classification alon g descriptive an d norm ative lines).
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ideal circum stan ces, ultim ately th ey can n ot provide a
com pellin g n orm ative accoun t of th e role of judicial review
because their prescription s are too discon nected from th e
realities of judicial practice w ith in th e broader con stitution al
order.
Wh ile m ore positive theories do n ot have th is problem ,
th ey can fail to provide an attractive n orm ative vision of w h at
judicial review sh ould accom plish in m odern society. Positive
th eories of dialogue rest on th e tw in foun dation s th at judicial
decision s about constitution al m ean in g are n ot fin al, an d that
th e political bran ches of govern m en t an d oth er social actors are
also th orough ly en gaged in an sw erin g con stitution al question s.
How ever, recogn izin g th at n on-judicial actors w ith greater
dem ocratic creden tials play a legitim ate an d valuable role in
th e in terpretation of the Con stitution requires th ese theories to
justify w h y judges sh ould also be in volved in th is task.38 The
reason w h y m an y positive th eories fail in th is regard is because
th ey are un able to satisfactorily explain som e special judicial
role or som e un ique con tribution th at judges m ake to
con stitution al dialogue th at can accoun t for th e n orm ative
value of judicial review . Th e m ost prom isin g th eories of
con stitution al dialogue, in con trast, are th ose w h ich account for
a un ique judicial function th at assists in reach in g better
an sw ers about constitution al question s, but w h ich does n ot
privilege th e judicial con tribution over th at of oth er actors.
III.

CRITIQ UING THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE

Th is Part provides a typology of th e differin g th eories of
con stitution al dialogue, in order to provide a m ore detailed
assessm en t of h ow
w ell th ese theories respond to
coun term ajoritarian con cern s, an d h ow successful th ey are in
providin g a n orm atively attractive accoun t of w h at judicial
review sh ould accom plish in m odern society. Th e Part begins
w ith an exam in ation of th e m ost prescriptive th eories, m ovin g
progressively alon g th e prescriptive—descriptive axis tow ards
th e m ore positive th eories of dialogue. At th e en d of th is
38

See, e.g., An drew Petter, Tw enty Years of Charter Justification: Xrom
Liberal Legalism to D ubious D ialogue, 52 U.N.B. L.J. 187, 195 (2003) (“[I]n arguing
th at court decision s un der the Charter are ultim ately less in fluential th an is som etim es
supposed, dialogue theory calls in to question w h y courts should be allow ed to m ake
such decision s in the first place.”). Cf. Earl M. Maltz, The Suprem e Court and the
Q uality of Political D ialogue, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 375, 388 (1988) (“Th e in ability of
judges to con tribute un iquely to public debate un derm in es dialogue th eory.”).
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assessm en t, w e w ill h ave a clearer idea of w hich th eories are
th e m ost n orm atively successful, and a better un derstan din g of
w ays in w h ich th e dialogue project sh ould be advan ced in th e
future.
A.

Theories ofJudicialM ethod

Th e m ost prescriptive th eories of con stitution al dialogue
can con ven iently be described as theories of judicial m ethod.
Th eir un ifyin g feature is th at th ey advocate th e self-con scious
use of certain judicial decision -m akin g techn iques to en able
judges to stim ulate an d en courage broader debate about
con stitution al m ean in g both w ith and w ith in th e political
bran ch es of governm en t. Closer exam in ation reveals, h ow ever,
th at th ese theories largely fail as vision s of constitution al
dialogue because th eir prescriptions for judicial action do n ot
take sufficient account of th e pre-existin g positive dyn am ics of
th e constitution al system .
1.

Judicial Advice-Givin g

Judicialadvice-giving theories suggest th at judges use a
ran ge of proactive interpretive and decision-m akin g tech n iques
in order to recom m end particular courses of action to th e
political branch es and to advise th em of w ays to avoid
con stitution al problem s. In gen eral term s, all form s of advicegivin g in volve judges coun selin g the political branch es of
govern m en t th rough the use of broad n on-bindin g dicta. Th e
prin cipal aim of th ese tech n iques is to ensure th at th e political
bran ch es learn the judiciary’s view s about con stitution al
m ean in g, w h ich w ill assist th em in draftin g n ew legislation, or
am en din g current legislation, so th at it w ill survive future
con stitution al ch allen ges.39 Alth ough judicial advice-giving
th eories purport to be dialogic in n ature, w e w ill see th at th ey
h ave a ran ge of flaw s th at ultim ately detract from th e
n orm ative m erit of th is claim .

39

Th e m ost prom in ent w orks advocatin g judicial advice-giving techn iques
are: Neal Kum ar Katyal, Judges as A dvicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709 (1998); Ron ald
J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Xlares: O n Judges, Legislatures, and D ialogue, 83
MINN. L. REV. 1 (1998); an d Erik Lun a, Constitutional R oad M aps, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1125 (2000).
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Th ere are tw o principal w ays in w h ich judges can utilize
advice-givin g tech n iques in th e con text of specific cases.40 First,
judges m ay in validate legislation on constitution al groun ds, yet
also provide advice to th e political branch es regardin g
con stitution ally acceptable m eth ods for ach ievin g th e sam e
en d.41
Com m en tators h ave referred to such m eth ods as
“con stitution al road m aps,” en ablin g judges to strike dow n
statutory provision s, but th en offer a “road m ap” for legislators
to follow w h en th ey draft n ew legislation.42 Secon d, judges m ay
uph old legislation as con stitution al, w h ile at th e sam e tim e
usin g tech n iques th at en courage political actors to revise
statutes in order to rem ove am biguities an d vaguen ess from
th e law .43 Sim ilar tech n iques are in volved w h en judges uph old
a statute as con stitution al, but advise the political bran ch es
th at an y statute goin g furth er th an th e on e uph eld is likely to
be in validated as un con stitution al in future litigation .44
Draw in g on th e approach taken by Judge Calabresi in h is
con currence in U nited States v. Then,45 th ese tech n iques en able
judges to sen d clear w arn in gs to Con gress regardin g th e
poten tial un con stitution ality of its curren t an d future policy
ch oices, so th at legislators can avoid political courses of action
th at are “fraugh t w ith con stitution al dan ger.”4$
Th eorists w h o favor th e in creased use of judicial advicegivin g believe th at th e proactive dispen sation of advice creates
th e con ditions for productive dialogue betw een th e courts an d
th e political bran ch es about con stitution al m ean in g an d
40
Katyal provides an exten sive typology of judicial advice-giving techn iques.
See generally Katyal, supra n ote 39. In addition to the tech n iques discussed in th is
Article, he refers to “education ” an d “m oralization .” Id. at 1720. He does n ot, how ever,
focus in great detail on these techn iques due to h is prin cipal concern to prom ote
m eth ods of advice-givin g in w h ich the judiciary m ore directly guides the other bran ch es
of govern m en t. In deed, these tech n iques seem to be of a differen t dialogic kin d to oth er
advice-giving tech n iques, as th ey en able the judiciary to in fluence popular discussion
on con stitution al issues. For furth er discussion of such form s of in teraction , see infra
Part III.B.2.i.
41
See Katyal, supra note 39, at 1718 (referrin g to th is techn ique as
“exem plification ”).
42
See Lun a, supra note 39, at 1127.
43
Katyal, supra note 39, at 171$-18 (referrin g to such techn iques as
“clarification ,” “self-alien ation,” an d “person ification ”).
44
Id. at 1719 (referrin g to th is tech n ique as “dem arcation”). Th e concept of
“constitution al flares” proposed by Ron ald Krotoszyn ski in volves a sim ilar judicial
fun ction . See Krotoszyn ski, supra n ote 39, at 8.
45
5$ F.3d 4$4, 4$7 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., con curring) (uph oldin g
federal sen tencin g guidelines w h ich h ad a disproportion ate im pact on African
Am erican s in a Fifth Am en dm ent equal protection ch allen ge).
4$
Krotoszynski, supra note 39, at 54.
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respon sibility. A cen tral aspect of th is dialogue is th at th e
political bran ch es can learn about w ays to approach
con stitution al problem s an d are en couraged to craft
appropriate respon ses.47 As Neil Katyal h as argued, th ese
dialogic tech n iques sh ow h ow “th e Court can be the faith ful
servan t of con stitutionalism an d act as a partn er w ith th e
legislature at th e sam e tim e.”48 Th eorists w h o support judicial
advice-givin g also claim th at th e dialogue th at th ese tech n iques
foster is n orm atively desirable, as its enables judges to
proactively protect righ ts w h ile at th e sam e tim e facilitate
political, rather th an judicial, an sw ers to con stitution al
con troversies.49 Th ey argue th at n ot on ly does th is em pow er
dem ocratic self-governm en t and popular accoun tability, but
th at it also alleviates con cern s about th e counterm ajoritarian
difficulty.50
Th e problem s w ith th is accoun t are so great, h ow ever,
an d th e description of dialogue provided so theoretically
im poverish ed, th at it is question able w h eth er judicial advicegivin g sh ould be described as a th eory of con stitution al
dialogue at all. First, by suggestin g th at courts take a
proactive approach to advisin g an d guiding th e political
bran ch es, th is accoun t assum es th at judges eith er possess a
special capacity, or can be better trusted, to resolve question s
of con stitution al m ean in g an d to evaluate th e im portan ce of
specific con stitution al values.51 Th e th eory thereby serves to
privilege th e judicial voice as th e key gen erator of
con stitution al discussion an d m ean in g.
Furth er, th is
privilegin g of th e judicial role does n ot successfully deal w ith
47

See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 39, at 1794 (n oting th at “[s]uch advice . . . is an
im portan t step in the creation of cooperative dialogue betw een the bran ch es”).
48
Id.
49
Id. at 1712 (“[O]nce the advice givin g view is adopted, a space develops for
courts to act affirm atively w ithout com prom isin g th e pow er of th ese other political
en tities.”) (em ph asis added).
50
See, e.g., Krotoszyn ski, supra n ote 39, at 59 (“Properly deployed, a
con stitution al flare facilitates less con fron tation al judicial in teraction s w ith th e
political bran ch es an d reduces th e coun term ajoritarian bite of judicial review .”); Lun a,
supra n ote 39, at 1208 (“Th e overarch in g tenor of th is strategy . . . should be one of
com ity an d cooperation w ith th e political branches, encouragin g dialogue w h ile
tem perin g the stin g of judicial review .”). Katyal acknow ledges th at som e question s
regardin g the dem ocratic legitim acy of judicial review rem ain w ith h is approach .
Katyal, supra note 39, at 1822-23. Non eth eless, he suggests th at th e advice-givin g
approach “can soften the blow of judicial review .” See id. at 1794.
51
Krotoszynski is m ost explicit about th is. See Krotoszyn ski, supra n ote 39,
at 53 (“[E]n un ciatin g an d protectin g con stitution al values con stitutes a duty peculiarly
w ith in th e judiciary’s dom ain.”).

112$

BR O O K LYN LA W R E V IE W

[Vol. 71:3

dem ocratic legitim acy con cern s, as proponen ts of advice-givin g
tech n iques claim it does. Wh ile th e utilization of advice-givin g
tech n iques m ay m ean th at few er pieces of legislation are
actively struck dow n by judges, to claim th at dem ocratic selfgovern m en t is en h anced by these tech n iques is rath er
disin gen uous, as th is position does n ot allow real space for
in dependen t political judgm en t.
Furth erm ore, given th e
privilegin g of th e judiciary’s voice in institution al exch an ges,
over tim e th is approach is likely to lead to th e gradual
replacem en t of relevan t legislative con sideration s w ith judicial
perspectives.
Secon d, th is un derstan din g of dialogue reveals a
correspondin g distrust of the ability of th e political bran ch es,
specifically th e legislature, to reach acceptable an sw ers
w ith out judicial interven tion . Th is distrust appears to be
based less on a fear th at legislatures are n ot sufficien tly
m otivated to defen d righ ts, th an on th e assum ption th at th e
political bran ch es are n ot in stitution ally com peten t to do so
w ith out judicial assistan ce.52 Advice-givin g th eorists consider
th at legislatures are quite rem oved from th e task of m akin g
th ough tful an d prin cipled decisions about th e m ean in g of
con stitution al values, due to th e force of self-interest th at
frequen tly com pels th em to prioritize questions of in cum ben cy
an d th e m axim ization of m ajoritarian preferen ces. In th is
con text, th ese th eorists assert that judicial advice provides
legislators w ith th e added in cen tives th ey n eed to take
con stitution al values seriously in th e face of com petin g
pressures.
Th is distrust of th e political bran ches rests on
em pirically dubious assum ption s about th e com parative
in stitution al com peten ce of courts an d th e political bran ch es of
govern m en t th at both den y an y real value to th e in depen dent
m oral deliberation s of political actors, an d restrict
con stitution al in terpretation an d th e evolution of constitution al
m ean in g to judicial pron oun cem ents.53 If on e delves a little
52
At tim es, Katyal does refer to benefits in con gression al participation in
con stitution al decision -m akin g, an d also as to con stitution al rem edy. Katyal, supra
n ote 39, at 1757-58, 1811. How ever, he ultim ately con siders th at th e Court h as the
greater, m ore im portan t role in con stitution al dialogue given th e “‘perspicuity’ an d
‘system atic ch aracter’ of judges.” Id. at 1757 (quoting Jam es Madison in 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 139 (Max Farran d ed., 1911)).
53
See, e.g., Janet L. Hiebert, Parliam ent and R ights, in PROTECTING HUMAN
RIGHTS: INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS 231, 234 (Tom Cam pbell et. al. eds., 2003)
(describing such assum ption s about com parative in stitution al com peten ce as “cyn ical
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deeper in to h ow legislatures operate, it is apparen t they do in
fact h ave incen tives to deliberate about issues of righ ts an d are
gen erally adept at doin g so, even if th ey do n ot en gage in
deliberation in exactly th e sam e fashion as courts.54 For
exam ple, even if legislators are con cerned to m axim ize th eir
ch an ces for reelection, th eir con stituents m ay w ell care about
con stitution al righ ts an d expect th eir represen tatives to take
th ese righ ts seriously.55 Legislators m ay also view th eir
in stitution al role as on e th at n ecessitates a careful focus on
righ ts. Th is can be eviden ced by records of legislative debates
th at sh ow represen tatives takin g righ ts-based deliberation
seriously an d m odifying th eir view s as a result of discussion
an d criticism .5$ Wh ile it m ay w ell be true that legislatures
balan ce righ ts an d in terest-based con sideration s in a m an n er
or ratio th at is differen t th an courts, given th e differen t
in stitution al incen tives operatin g on th e various bran ches of
govern m en t,57 th ese factors n everth eless suggest th at
legislatures h ave im portan t con tributions to m ake in relation
to th e con sideration of con stitution al values an d do n ot require
judicial advice to take th ese values in to account.
In ligh t of th ese con siderations, judicial advice-givin g
can essen tially be re-described as a th eory th at en courages
activist judges to tell the political bran ch es of govern m en t h ow

an d n arrow ”); see also Keith E. Wh ittin gton , E xtrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation: Three O bjections and R esponses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 821 (2002)
[h erein after Wh ittin gton, E xtrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation] (arguin g th at
w h ile “[w ]e m ay disagree w ith th e conclusion s th at various extrajudicial bodies
reach . . . it is difficult to m ain tain th at such extrajudicial decision s are uncon sidered
or n eglect con siderations of justice an d principle”).
54
See, e.g., KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra n ote 2, at 237-39
(discussin g various institution ally specific w ays in w h ich Con gress deliberates about
con stitution al issues); Mark Tush n et, N on-Judicial R eview , 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 453,
492 (2003) (exam in ing the in cen tives on various non -judicial actors to take
con stitution al review seriously, an d concludin g th at “[n ]on -judicial in stitution s can
balan ce com petin g con stitution al in terests, an d they do so because they h ave incen tives
guidin g them tow ard balan cing”).
55
See, e.g., TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION, supra n ote 2, at $5-$$.
5$
See, e.g., Jerem y Waldron, Som e M odels of D ialogue Betw een Judges and
Legislators, 23 S. CT. L. REV. (2d) 7, 28-29 (2004) (con trastin g th e “debate” am on g th e
justices of th e Suprem e Court in R oe v. W ade w ith debates in th e British House of
Com m on s on the Medical Term in ation of Pregn an cy Bill to dem on strate the proficiency
w ith w h ich legislatures can engage in in depen den t righ ts-based deliberation ).
57
Mark Tush net, Xorm s of Judicial R eview as E xpressions of Constitutional
Patriotism , 22 LAW & PHIL. 353, 3$0-$1 (2003) [h erein after Tush net, Constitutional
Patriotism ] (discussing h ow th e balan ce of in terest-based an d righ ts-based
con sideration s of legislatures m ay be differen t to th at in th e judicial bran ch ).
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Wh ile judges m ay n ot
to in terpret th e Constitution .58
im m ediately strike dow n legislation th at does n ot satisfy th eir
con stitution al un derstan din gs, th eir advice is a form of actively
servin g n otice th at th ey w ill do so in th e future if legislation is
n ot am en ded in accordan ce w ith standards acceptable to the
Court. Accordin gly, rath er th an supportin g a gen uin e dialogic
exch an ge of ideas am ong equals, or even th e creation of greater
space for th e political bran ch es to deliberate in depen dently
about questions of con stitution al m ean in g, advice-givin g sim ply
en courages th e political bran ch es to do w h at the judiciary says.
2.

Process-Centered Rules

Rath er th an tellin g legislators h ow to resolve
con stitution al issues, process-centered rules m erely seek to
en sure th at th e political actors w ho en act statutes and m ake
public policy decisions take constitution al considerations in to
accoun t. In process-centered theories, judges are en couraged to
determ in e w heth er political officials h ave paid sufficient
atten tion or adequately deliberated on policy judgm en ts th at
affect substan tive constitution al values. If it is determ in ed
th at th ey h ave n ot, then th e judiciary m ay force th e political
bran ch es of govern m ent to reconsider th eir decisions w ith th e
appropriate level of atten tion to those values.59
A w ide ran ge of process-cen tered rules exist, ran gin g
from clear statem en t rules, w h ich con cern th e degree of clarity
w ith w h ich political actors m ust speak w h en en actin g law s th at
im plicate con stitution al values,$0 to constitutional “w h o” rules,
w h ich direct atten tion to th e proper governm en tal actors to
prom ulgate different areas of policy.$1 An oth er w ell-kn ow n
form of process-cen tered rule is the “second look” doctrin e th at

58
Katyal h im self describes advice-givin g as a “proactive” theory of judgin g.
See Katyal, supra note 39, at 1711.
59
Th e m ost com prehen sive survey of process-cen tered doctrines in Un ited
States con stitution al law h as been provided by Dan Coenen. See generally Dan T.
Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration:Protecting Xundam ental V alues w ith SecondLook R ules of Interbranch D ialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 18$$-$9 (2001)
[h erein after Coenen , A Constitution of Collaboration]; Dan T. Coenen, Structural
R eview , Pseudo-Second-Look D ecision M aking and the R isk of D iluting Constitutional
Liberty, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1881 (2001) [h erein after Structural R eview ]; Dan T.
Coenen, The R ehnquist Court, Structural D ue Process, and Sem isubstantive
ConstitutionalR eview , 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281 (2002).
$0
See Coenen, A Constitution ofCollaboration, supra n ote 59, at 1$03-40.
$1
Id. at 1773-1805.
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Judge Guido Calabresi h as proposed.$2 Th is doctrin e is used
w h en th e legislature h as acted w ith “h aste or th ough tlessn ess”
or “h idin g” w ith respect to fundam ental rights.$3 Th is could
occur for a variety of reason s, in cludin g pan ic or crisis, lack of
tim e, or because th e legislature h as delegated certain tasks to
un accoun table bureaucrats. In such circum stan ces, Calabresi
advocates “in validat[in g] th e possibly offen din g law an d
forc[in g] the legislature to take a ‘secon d look’ w ith the eyes of
th e people on it.”$4 Wh ile judges m ust offer provision al
defin ition s of righ ts w hen perform in g th is role, th e legislature
can reject th ese suggestions if it decides to reen act th e
offendin g statutory provision s in th e future in an open m an n er.
Usin g th e secon d look rule, judges can th us enh an ce legislative
accoun tability w h ile leavin g th e dem ocratically elected
legislature w ith th e poten tial to h ave th e fin al w ord.
Propon en ts of process-cen tered rules assert th at th ey
en able judges to in itiate a process of dialogue w ith an d am on g
political officials, leadin g to the sh ared elaboration of
con stitution al m ean in g.$5 Th e dialogic role for th e judiciary in
such interactions is tw o-fold. First, th e use of th ese rules
allow s judges to step back from conclusively decidin g cases in
order to increase th e space available for dem ocratic
deliberation an d ch oice.$$ At th e sam e tim e, th e th eory
con tin ues to propose an active role for th e judiciary in
con stitution al dialogue, as process-cen tered rules en courage
judges to en gage th e political bran ches m ore explicitly an d
directly in constitutional debate w h ere political officials h ave
m ade policy judgm en ts th at paid in sufficien t attention to
substan tive con stitution al values.$7 Th e correspon din g role of
th e political bran ches in th is dialogue is to respon d to judicial

$2

See generally Guido Calabresi, The Suprem e Court 1990 Term , Xorew ord:
A ntidiscrim ination and Constitutional Accountability (W hat the Bork-Brennan D ebate
Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80, 104 (1991). See also generally Coen en , A Constitution
ofCollaboration, supra note 59.
$3
Calabresi, supra note $2, at 104 (“Wh en there is h idin g, n eith er th e people
n or their represen tatives are gen uin ely speakin g; w hen there is h aste, they m ay be
speakin g, but w ith out the atten tion required for th e protection of righ ts.”).
$4
Id.
$5
See, e.g., Coen en, A Constitution of Collaboration, supra note 59, at 1583
(statin g th at “[t]h rough the use of . . . process-cen tered rules, th e Court in itiates a
dialogue w ith an d am on g n on judicial actors”); see also id. at 1587 (“All th ese
rules . . . serve to engage political officials directly in con stitutional decision -m aking.”).
$$
Dan Coenen lin ks the broader logic of structural rules to deliberative
dem ocracy. See id. at 18$$-$9.
$7
Id. at 1582.
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decision s in an open , reason ed, an d careful w ay an d to m ake
future policy decision s w ith appropriate levels of care and
deliberation . Th is approach is th us an im provem en t on
dialogic th eories of judicial advice-givin g, as it recogn izes th at
legislatures can and do en gage in th e consideration of prin ciple
w h en interpretin g th e Con stitution , but also ackn ow ledges th at
som etim es th ey n eed to be m ore can did an d open about th eir
treatm en t of righ ts.
Process-cen tered th eory is also m ore successful as a
dialogic th eory in oth er w ays. First, th is accoun t m in im izes
dem ocratic legitim acy con cerns by in creasin g space for th e
political bran ch es to resolve substan tive questions of
con stitution al m ean in g.$8 At th e sam e tim e, th is un derstan din g
of dialogue is m ore n orm atively attractive than advice-givin g
th eory because it is groun ded on m ore realistic prem ises about
h ow the legislative and political processes operate. Alth ough
supporters of process-cen tered rules trust th at political actors
are capable an d com peten t to en gage in con stitution al
in terpretation , th ey suggest th at th ey m ay n ot con sistently pay
sufficient atten tion to con stitution al values due to th e
in stitution al features of, or conflictin g incen tives in , th e
political process, such as tim e constrain ts or electoral or party
pressures.$9 In th ese circum stan ces, judges m erely serve the
useful function of en gagin g th e political branch es in a dialogue
about th e im portan ce of considerin g con stitution al values in a
reason ed and con sistent fash ion .
Despite th ese advan tages, th is th eory of dialogue does
n ot com pletely overcom e concerns about th e dem ocratic
legitim acy of judicial review . On e question th at rem ains
un an sw ered relates to h ow process-cen tered rules an d
substan tive rules of judicial decision-m akin g in teract.
Specifically, w h en sh ould judges use process-centered rules,
an d w h en sh ould th ey use substantive rules to strike dow n
legislation * Given that th e dialogue created by th e use of

$8
See, e.g., Mark Tushn et, Subconstitutional Constitutional Law :
Supplem ent, Sham , or Substitute?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1871, 1879 (2001)
[h erein after Tush net, SubconstitutionalConstitutionalLaw ] (observin g th at the “en tire
poin t [of process-centered rules] is to en sure full con sideration of con stitution al norm s
by the political bran ch es w ithout dictatin g the con ten t of those bran ches’ con clusion s”).
$9
As Jan et Hiebert h as said, “On e need n ot accept th e claim th at the
judiciary is un iquely equipped to in terpret righ ts to recogn ize th e sign ifican ce of the
judiciary’s relative in sulation from public an d political pressures.” JANET L. HIEBERT,
CHARTER CONFLICTS: WHAT IS PARLIAMENT’S ROLE* 53 (2002) [h erein after HIEBERT,
CHARTER CONFLICTS]; see also infra Part III.B.4.
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process-centered rules on ly accoun ts for a particular part of th e
judicial process, w h en th e Court uses substan tive rules th e
coun term ajoritarian difficulty again rears its head.70
A m ore fun dam en tal criticism is th at use of processcen tered rules m ay en tail un seen dem ocratic costs. Wh ile
judicial decision s usin g th ese rules leave theoretical space for
in dependen t political judgm en t and action , in practice th e
political bran ches m ay w ell en coun ter substan tial difficulty
revisitin g th eir earlier decision s.71 Th is m ean s th at in m any
circum stances, legislators w ill un likely be able to take a
“secon d look” at policy decision s, even if th e judiciary leaves
th em w ith the opportun ity to do so. For exam ple, th e political
equilibrium th at existed at th e tim e of a statute’s en actm en t
m ay h ave ch an ged, m akin g it m ore difficult for th e legislature
to ach ieve consen sus on th e issue in question. Furth erm ore,
th e issue m ay n o lon ger h ave sufficien t political salien ce, n or
be con sidered sufficien tly im portan t, to w arran t takin g up
furth er tim e and legislative resources. As a result, th e th eory
of con stitution al dialogue based on process-cen tered rules m ay
n ot leave as m uch space for in depen den t political judgm en t as
first appears.
3.

Judicial Min im alism

In con trast to th e th eories exam in ed above that cen ter
on h ow judges can actively encourage dialogue w ith th e
political branch es, judicial m inim alism in volves judges
steppin g back from decidin g cases in order to allow increased
space for dem ocratic con sideration and ch oice. Th is approach
to judicial decision-m akin g can be traced to th e w ork of
Alexan der Bickel. Bickel w as a stron g supporter of the
“passive virtues,” w h ich in clude such tech n iques as ripen ess,
stan din g, m ootn ess, th e void for vaguen ess doctrin e, th e
political question s doctrin e, an d th e gran t of certiorari.72 In
con trast to th e Suprem e Court’s ability to strike dow n or
70
Coenen h im self ackn ow ledges th at th is is a problem . See Coenen,
StructuralR eview , supra note 59, at 1890-91.
71
On som e of th e possible difficulties w ith legislative action follow in g judicial
in validation on process-cen tered groun ds, see Mark Tushn et, Subconstitutional
Constitutional Law , supra note $8, at 1872-7$; Mark Tush net, A lternative Xorm s of
JudicialR eview , 101 MICH. L. REV. 2781, 2794-95 (2003).
72
On th e passive virtues, see gen erally BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH, supra note 9, at ch. 4 an d Alexan der M. Bickel, Xorew ord: The Passive
V irtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (19$1).
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uph old legislation , th e passive virtues are judicial tech n iques of
“n ot doin g” th at allow th e Court to “persuad[e] before it
attem pts to coerce.”73 Wh ile Bickel considered th at th e Court
h as a special role to play in judicial review due to its ability to
protect an d defen d principle,74 th e passive virtues en able judges
to reduce th eir in volvem en t in con troversial or sensitive
con stitution al issues in order to protect th em selves from
poten tial political backlash . At th e sam e tim e, judicial use of
th e passive virtues encourages constitution al dialogue as th ey
give th e political bran ch es of governm en t, togeth er w ith
society, th e opportunity to debate an d resolve divisive
con stitution al issues th rough dem ocratic ch an n els, w h ile th e
issue of prin ciple “rem ain s in abeyan ce an d ripen s.”75
Cass Sun stein , th e principal con tem porary propon en t of
“judicial m in im alism ,” advocates th at in decidin g cases, judges
sh ould adopt th e strategy of “sayin g n o m ore th an n ecessary to
justify an outcom e, an d leavin g as m uch as possible
un decided.”7$ Sun stein goes m uch further th an Bickel in
exam in in g w ays in w h ich judges can exercise self-restrain t
w h en they decide cases th at bear on con troversial
con stitution al issues.77 In particular, h e focuses on strategies
th at lead judges to issue n arrow an d sh allow h oldin gs, as
opposed to w ide and deep h oldin gs, w h en th ey do decide a case.
Th e prin ciple of n arrow n ess counsels th at judges sh ould try to
h an d dow n decision s th at are n o broader than n ecessary to
resolve the case at h an d.78 Sh allow n ess, in contrast, requires
judges to avoid consideration of questions of basic prin ciple as
m uch as possible and instead aim to reach “concrete judgm en ts
on particular cases, unaccom pan ied by abstract accoun ts about
73

BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 9, at 28, 88.
See infra Part III.B.2.
75
See BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra n ote 9, at 244-72
(describing the Southern opposition to Brow n v. Board of E ducation an d the judicial
strategies used to reduce political backlash ). In th is dialogic vein, Bickel described the
passive virtues as w ays of “elicitin g an sw ers, sin ce so often they en gage th e Court in a
Socratic colloquy w ith the other in stitution s of govern m en t an d w ith society as a
w h ole.” Id. at 70-71.
7$
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 3 (1999) [h erein after SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME]; see also
generally Cass R. Sun stein , The Suprem e Court 1995 Term – Xorew ord:Leaving Things
U ndecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (199$).
77
Th is is explained by th e fact th at Sun stein, un like Bickel, favors
techn iques of judicial m in im alism for th eir prom otion of deliberative dem ocracy. See
infra n ote 84.
78
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 7$, at 10-11 (describin g
m in im alist judges as “decid[in g] th e case at h an d; they do not decide other cases too”).
74
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w h at accoun ts for those judgm en ts.”79 Alth ough Sun stein does
n ot h im self describe judicial m in im alism as a th eory of
con stitution al dialogue, th e dialogic n ature of th e th eory h as
been observed and supported by a n um ber of sch olars.80 On
th eir understan din g, tech n iques of judicial m in im alism are a
form of passive judicial participation in constitution al dialogue
because th ey en able judges to open a dialogue w ith th e political
bran ch es of governm en t, w h ich serves to en courage th e
political resolution of con stitution al issues th at are th e subject
of disagreem ent.
As oth er com m en tators h ave observed, judicial
m in im alism is quite successful in respon din g to th e
coun term ajoritarian difficulty. By en couragin g debate an d
deliberation in the political bran ch es, th e use of judicial
m in im alist tech n iques en h an ces the space available to th e
political bran ch es to flesh out dem ocratic resolutions to
con stitution al issues, specifically issues of righ ts, w h ich are th e
subject of disagreem ent.81 At th e sam e tim e, th e th eory also
respon ds to con cerns about policy distortion an d dem ocratic
debilitation . Policy distortion is reduced by en couragin g th e
resolution of constitution al issues through dem ocratic
ch an n els, as legislatures m ust m ake indepen den t decision s
about w h at th e Con stitution requires in specific cases. Th e
problem of dem ocratic debilitation is also reduced as th e use of
m in im alist tech n iques sen ds a m essage to legislatures th at
th ey can n ot defer to judges to resolve difficult an d con tentious
con stitution al questions.
Wh ile th ese are positive con tributions, it is arguable
th at judicial m in im alism goes too far in dow n playin g th e
legitim acy an d com peten cy of th e judiciary to participate in
decision s about con stitution al m ean in g. In th is regard, despite
th e virtues of dialogue in en h an cin g dem ocratic debate,
Sun stein considers th at judicial m in im alism sh ould be lim ited
to cases th at “in volve issues of h igh factual or eth ical
79

Id. at 13.
See, e.g., Mich ael Heise, Prelim inary Thoughts on the V irtues of Passive
D ialogue, 34 AKRON L. REV. 73, 73, 77-79 (2000) (describing Sun stein ’s decision al
m in im alism as a form of passive judicial participation in con stitution al dialogue); Jay
D. Wexler, D efending the M iddle W ay: Interm ediate Scrutiny as Judicial M inim alism ,
$$ GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 309 (1998) (describin g judicial m in im alism as a w ay in
w h ich “the Court can open a dialogue w ith other governm en tal actors”).
81
See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, H as the H our of D em ocracy Com e R ound at
Last? The N ew Critique of Judicial R eview , 17 CONST. COMMENT. $83, $88-89 (2000)
(discussin g som e of the stren gth s of Sun stein ’s approach to un derstan din g the Suprem e
Court).
80
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com plexity th at are producin g dem ocratic disagreem en t.”82 In
oth er cases, th e use of m in im alist tech n iques m ay in crease
judicial decision an d error costs, an d m ay th reaten th e rule of
law to th e exten t that it m akes plan n in g m ore difficult.
Sun stein also argues th at judges h ave a specialized
in stitution al role to play w h ere it appears th at th e political
process has failed. In such circum stances, m axim alist rulin gs
m ay be required in order to ensure adh eren ce to th e
preconditions of dem ocracy, such as freedom of speech , an d to
guard again st defects in th e dem ocratic processes.83
Th is explan ation of the utility of m axim alist judicial
decision s does n ot explain w h y th e judicial role sh ould be
lim ited in all oth er cases to on e of m in im alism . Sunstein
favors judicial m in im alism solely because it prom otes greater
dem ocratic deliberation w ith in th e political bran ch es.84 Most
dialogue th eorists, h ow ever, also favor a dialogic
un derstan din g of judicial review due to th e poten tial it creates
for reach in g better answ ers to con stitution al questions. If on e
takes th is view , th en a m ore substan tive con ception of the
judicial role m ay be favored for its poten tial to h elp us reach
deep an d broad con sen sus about con stitution al m ean in g, or for
its poten tial to produce an sw ers th at com bin e th e un ique
in stitution al perspectives of diverse dialogic actors.85 Th ere are
th us oth er possible roles th at a stron g judicial voice in
con stitution al dialogue could play, w h ich judicial m in im alism
fails to consider.
Th ese un derstan din gs of th e value of
82
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 7$, at 4$; see also id. at 2$3
(observin g th at “[m ]in im alism is n ot alw ays th e best w ay to proceed”).
83
See id. at 54-57 (outlin in g a n um ber of problem s iden tified w ith
m in im alism in particular cases).
84
Put another w ay, Sun stein favors m in im alism for its prom otion of the
deliberative dem ocratic ideals of governm en t. See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME,
supra note 7$, at 24 (“There is a close con nection betw een m in im alism an d
dem ocracy. . . . [T]h e Am erican con stitution al system
aspires not to sim ple
m ajoritarian ism , an d n ot to th e aggregation of private ‘preferen ces,’ but to a system of
deliberative dem ocracy.”).
In relation to Sunstein ’s con ception of deliberative
dem ocracy, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993).
85
See, e.g., Paul Horw itz, Law ’s E xpression: The Prom ise and Perils of
JudicialO pinion W riting in Canadian ConstitutionalLaw , 38 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 101,
124 (2000) (arguin g th at Sun stein ’s m in im alism does not appropriately balan ce “th e
risks of judicial activism again st th e risks of judicial quietism ,” given th e im portan t
educative role th at Court can play in con stitution al dialogue). Cf. Ch ristopher J.
Peters, A ssessing the N ew Judicial M inim alism , 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454, 1492-1513
(2000) (criticizin g substan tive, as opposed to procedural, m in im alism for dow n playin g
th e special in stitution al com peten ce of courts to protect in dividual righ ts again st th e
m ajority); Wexler, supra note 80, at 337 (w h ile favorin g judicial m in im alism in m an y
circum stan ces, suggestin g th at th e Court also “stan ds in a un ique position to spur an d
in fluence public debate”).
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con stitution al dialogue an d th e stren gth of th ese different
con ception s of th e judicial role w ill be considered later in th is
article.8$ For n ow , h ow ever, th e point is flagged th at on e’s
view s about the n orm ative value of dialogue w ill in fluence
con ception s about th e judicial role, an d judicial m in im alism
m ay go too far in dow n playin g th e judiciary’s substantive
con tribution to broader con stitution al discussion .
Th us far, th eories of judicial m eth od h ave been critiqued
for th eir in ability to overcom e th e coun term ajoritarian
difficulty, an d on th e basis of th e problem atic roles th at they
propose for th e judiciary in constitution al dialogue.
An
addition al problem w ith all of th ese th eories as n orm ative
vision s of dialogue is that th ey are n ot sufficiently con n ected to
h ow judicial review operates in practice.87 Even if th ey provide
som e attractive prescriptions regardin g th e role th at judges
sh ould play in judicial review un der ideal circum stances, th ese
prescriptions w ill h ave little w orth if th ey are un likely to be
realized in ligh t of th e actual positive dyn am ics of the
con stitution al system in w h ich judges operate. In th is regard,
th eorists of judicial m eth od do n ot grapple sufficien tly w ith th e
question of th e exten t to w h ich th e realization of con stitution al
dialogue depen ds n ot on ly on judicial action , but also on h ow
th e political bran ch es of governm en t respon d to judicial
decision s in practice. In particular, if th e form s th at political
bran ch responses take are less dependen t on th e specific
decision -m akin g tech niques used by judges th an on th e broader
in stitution al dyn am ics of th e con stitution al order, then th ese
th eorists are w ron g to assum e th at th eir visions of dialogue can
be ach ieved sim ply by th e judicial use of such tech n iques. Th e
n orm ative value of theories of dialogic judicial m eth od an d
th eir accoun t of th e role of judicial review in m odern
con stitution alism is ultim ately dim in ish ed as a result of th is
lack of groundin g in th e positive dyn am ics of the con stitution al
system from w h ich th ey em erge. Fortun ately, h ow ever, th ere
rem ains a ran ge of th eories of constitution al dialogue th at do
begin from a m ore prom isin g institution al perspective.

8$

See infra Parts III.B.3-4 & IV.
See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, Constitutional Politics and Constitutional
Theory: A M isunderstood and N eglected R elationship, 27 LAW & SOC. INQ UIRY 309
(2002) (arguin g th at norm ative con stitution al theory should not develop w ithout a firm
un derstan din g of con stitution al politics).
87
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StructuralTheories ofD ialogue

Structural theories of dialogue are based on th e
recogn ition th at in stitution al or political m ech an ism s exist
w ith in constitution al system s th at en able political actors to
respon d to judicial decision s in th e even t of disagreem en t. On
th is m ore positive un derstandin g, dialogue about constitution al
m ean in g em erges w h en th ese m ech an ism s of response are
en gaged, en ablin g a dyn am ic process of to-and-fro to take place
betw een judges an d oth er con stitution al actors. To th e exten t
th at such dialogic dyn am ics are w idespread as a positive
m atter, structural th eories largely alleviate con cern s th at
judicial review operates in a coun term ajoritarian fashion .88
How ever, as th eories veer further tow ards th e prescriptive,
th ey h ave greater difficulty resolvin g the poten tial dem ocratic
costs of judicial review .
In relation to w h eth er structural th eories provide a
m ore satisfyin g n orm ative account of con stitution al dialogue,
th e results are also m ixed. In order to do so, th ey m ust be able
to propose som e special judicial role th at judges perform in th at
dialogue. Som e positive th eories of dialogue do n ot accoun t for
an y special judicial role. Oth er th eorists do propose a un ique
judicial con tribution to dialogue th at is th ough t to contribute to
better answ ers to con stitution al questions.89 In m an y cases,
h ow ever, th at role n oneth eless fails to provide a n orm atively
satisfyin g accoun t of dialogic judicial review because it
privileges th e judicial con tribution , w h ich m ay overw h elm th e
poten tial for dialogic con tribution s by th e equally im portan t
political bran ches of govern m en t. Th e m ost prom isin g th eories
of dialogue are th ose that successfully propose a un ique judicial
role th at does n ot privilege th e dialogic con tribution s of judges
in th is w ay.
88
Cf. Jeffrey Goldsw orth y, Judicial R eview , Legislative O verride, and
D em ocracy, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451 (2003) (distin guish in g betw een righ ts-based
objection s an d con sequen tialist objection s to judicial en forcem en t of con stitution al
righ ts).
89
Wh at con stitutes a “better” an sw er in differen t th eories varies in a w ay
th at parallels th eir differin g conception s of th e judicial role. Those based on a special
judicial role in relation to prin ciple con ceive of better an sw ers as an sw ers w h ich are
m ore prin cipled. Theories w h ich con ceive of a special judicial role in relation to
facilitatin g con stitution al debate con sider better an sw ers to be th ose w h ich are m ore
durable an d w idely accepted w ith in society. Fin ally, th eories based on distinctly
“judicial” function s th at judges perform in con stitution al decision -m akin g con sider
an sw ers to be better if they are m ade as a result of the com bin ation of un ique
in stitution al perspectives of differen t con stitution al actors. See infra Part III.
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Coordin ate Con struction Th eories

Th e m ost straigh tforw ard structural th eories of dialogue
are th ose based on coordinate construction of th e Con stitution.
Coordin ate construction is th e oldest con ception of
con stitution al in terpretation as a sh ared enterprise betw een
th e courts an d th e political bran ch es of govern m en t, h avin g
first been espoused by Jam es Madison .90 Wh ile ackn ow ledgin g
th at issues of constitution al in terpretation w ould n orm ally fall
to th e judiciary in th e ordin ary course of govern m en t, Madison
rejected th e view th at judicial decisions h ad any un ique status,
as th e Con stitution did n ot provide for an y specific auth ority to
determ in e th e lim its of th e division of pow ers betw een th e
differen t bran ch es. Sim ilarly, Th om as Jefferson considered
th at each bran ch of govern m en t m ust be “co-ordin ate an d
in dependen t of each oth er,” and th at each bran ch h as prim ary
respon sibility for in terpretin g th e Con stitution as it con cern s
its ow n functions.91
Man y sch olars h ave criticized Madison ’s an d Jefferson’s
vision of coordin ate con struction as dan gerous, given th at it
fails to specify th e areas of th e Constitution in relation to
w h ich each bran ch should h ave final in terpretive authority.
With out doin g so, each bran ch m igh t advocate rival
in terpretation s, n one of w h ich w ould h ave an y greater
auth ority or “fin ality” th an an oth er, leading to in terpretive
an arch y.92
Sch olars h ave also suggested th at com plete
in dependen ce of th e bran ch es to en gage in con stitution al
in terpretation in relation to th eir ow n fun ctions is in con sisten t
w ith th e system of ch ecks an d balan ces in the Un ited States
Con stitution .93
In th e Un ited States, coordin ate con struction th eory h as
been revived in recen t years in w ays th at purport to deal w ith

90

On Madison ’s position , see gen erally ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION
ch . 2 (1992).
91
FISHER, supra note 31, at 238. On Jefferson ’s position , see id. at 238-39;
JOHN AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 78-8$ (1984).
92
See, e.g., Larry Alexan der and Frederick Sch auer, O n E xtrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1379 (1997) (describin g
“protestan tism ” in con stitution al in terpretation , w h ich en tails parity of in terpretive
auth ority betw een the th ree bran ches of governm en t, as leadin g to “in terpretive
an arch y”).
93
See, e.g., AGRESTO, supra n ote 91, at 82-83 (“[I]f each bran ch could
absolutely an d w ith fin ality decide for itself th e boun ds of its ow n pow er, w here w ould
be the checkin g*”).
IN CONFLICT
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th ese con cerns.94 Neal Devin s and Louis Fisher draw on the
earlier th eories to propose a largely descriptive m odel of
con stitution al dialogue th at does n ot involve com plete
decen tralization of in terpretive auth ority, but in stead suggests
th at th e judiciary an d th e oth er branch es of govern m en t
in teract in a dialogic w ay to sh ape th e m ean in g of th e
Con stitution .95 According to th is un derstan din g, n ot on ly does
each bran ch of govern m en t en gage in con stitution al
con struction by in terpretin g its ow n con stitution al fun ctions,
but th ey also each have an addition al role in relation to
in terpretin g the Con stitution m ore broadly.9$ Th is does n ot
lead to in terpretive anarch y, h ow ever, because it in volves an
in teractive process in w h ich each bran ch of govern m en t is
ch ecked by th e oth ers, in cludin g th e Suprem e Court.97
Wh ile th e Court places ch ecks on the oth er bran ch es
th rough th e exercise of judicial review , th e political bran ches
can also place checks on th e Court w h en th ey disagree w ith its
in terpretation of th e Con stitution . Th is system of m utual
ch ecks is im portan t because all th e bran ch es of governm en t,
in cludin g th e Court, m ay reach un con stitution al results. Given
th at decision s of th e Court are open to scrutin y an d ch allen ge
by oth er public officials, judicial decisions are n ot fin al; “at
best, [th ey] m om en tarily resolve th e dispute im m ediately
94

See, e.g., Walter F. Murph y, W ho Shall Interpret? The Q uest for the
U ltim ate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 REV. POL. 401, 411-12, 417 (198$) (supportin g
m odified “departm en talism ”); Mich ael S. Paulsen, The M ost D angerous Branch:
E xecutive Pow er to Say W hat the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221 (1994) (suggestin g th at
“th e pow er to in terpret law is n ot the sole provin ce of th e judiciary; rath er, it is a
divided, sh ared pow er not delegated to an y one branch but an cillary to the function s of
all of th em w ith in the spheres of th eir en um erated pow ers”).
95
See generally NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES (199$);
FISHER, supra n ote 31; Neal Devin s & Louis Fisher, Judicial E xclusivity and Political
Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83 (1998) [h erein after Devin s & Fisher, Judicial
E xclusivity]. More recen tly, see DEVINS & FISHER, supra n ote 29, at 239. In Can ada,
w h ile it h as not been argued th at a system of dialogue based on coordin ate con struction
exists as a m atter of description, th ere is som e support for the theory at th e norm ative
level. See MANFREDI, supra n ote 3$, at 188 (arguin g th at a coordin ate construction
approach to th e Can adian Ch arter is n orm atively desirable as it w ould allow
legislature an d executives to share w ith courts “equal respon sibility an d authority to
in ject m ean in g in to the in determ in ate w ords an d ph rases of the Ch arter”); Ch ristopher
P. Man fredi & Jam es B. Kelly, Six D egrees of D ialogue: A R esponse to H ogg and
Bushell, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 513, 522-24 (1999).
9$
See Devin s & Fish er, JudicialE xclusivity, supra note 95, at 10$ (describin g
th e constitution al system of coordin ate construction as one in w h ich “each bran ch [is]
capable of an d w illin g to m ake indepen den t con stitution al in terpretation s”).
97
As Fish er says, “Judicial review fits our con stitution al system because w e
like to fragm en t pow er. We feel safer w ith checks an d balan ces . . . . Th is very
preferen ce for fragm en ted pow er den ies th e Suprem e Court an auth oritative an d fin al
voice for decidin g con stitution al question s.” FISHER, supra n ote 31, at 279.
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before th e Court.”98 Direct ch allen ges com e in such form s as
refusals to com ply, refusals to en force, and th reats to pack th e
Court.99 Con gress an d state legislatures can gen erate m ore
subtle ch allen ges by en actin g statutes th at defy or test th e
lim its of judicial in terpretations. Parties to litigation can also
brin g fresh proceedin gs at a later date in order to prom pt th e
Court to reconsider specific decision s. In such circum stan ces,
th e Court m ay revise an d perh aps reverse previous decision s,
th ereby allow in g th e con stitution al in terpretations of other
bran ch es to becom e auth oritative.
Th e effect of th ese dyn am ics en ablin g th e political
bran ch es to place ch ecks on th e Court does n ot m ean th at
judges are pow erless to m ove constitution al debate forw ard.
Rath er, th e Court can pron oun ce its view s and m ake
“exploratory m ovem en ts” th at m ay n udge the debate about
con stitution al m ean in g ah ead. Th is m ay then lead to th e
adoption of new con stitution al interpretations by th e oth er
bran ch es.100 In th ese circum stan ces, th e Court w ill on ly be
ch ecked if it steps too far out of lin e w ith th e view s of th e
political branch es an d oth er social forces. Addition ally, it m ay
n ot be ch ecked at all if legislative in ertia about a particular
issue is too great, or if th e political branch es prefer th e
judiciary to m aintain con trol over a particular issue.101 The
result of th is in teractive process in w h ich n o bran ch dom in ates
an d in w h ich con stitution al m ean in g steadily form s is
con stitution al dialogue, as “all th ree in stitution s are able to
expose w eakn esses, h old excesses in ch eck, and gradually forge
a con sen sus on constitution al issues.”102
In addition to
describin g
th e
positive
dyn am ics
of
con stitution al
in terpretation in th e Un ited States, th is un derstan din g of
dialogue is also supported as a n orm atively desirable w ay for
con stitution al m ean in g to develop over tim e, both because th e
Am erican constitution al system
dem on strates a clear

98

Devin s & Fisher, JudicialE xclusivity, supra note 95, at 91.
See generally FISHER, supra note 31, at ch. $.
100
Id. at 27$; see also DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 29, at 234 (“Courts
som etim es get out in fron t of an issue an d, in so doin g, set in m otion a con structive
in terbran ch dyn am ic th at oth erw ise w ouldn’t take place.”).
101
See, e.g., DEVINS, supra note 95, at 139-45, 150-53 (describin g legislative
in ertia regarding abortion ).
102
FISHER, supra note 31, at 275; accord DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 29, at
239.
99
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preferen ce for fragm en ted pow er,103 an d because such “vigorous
in terch an ge” betw een equal actors results in m ore “vibran t an d
durable” in terpretation of the Constitution.104
In both its descriptive an d n orm ative dim en sions,
coordin ate construction h as a n um ber of beneficial features.
First, Devin s and Fish er m ake a valuable con tribution by
providin g con crete exam ples th at dem on strate th at judges do
n ot h ave a m on opoly on con stitution al in terpretation.105 Th ese
em pirical insigh ts reveal th at constitution al in terpretation , as
a m atter of description an d as a m atter of h istorical practice in
th e Un ited States, occurs in diverse form s an d is un dertaken
by a ran ge of constitution al actors.10$ Given that th e bulk of
n orm ative constitutional th eory begin s from th e prem ise of
judicial suprem acy and rarely questions w h ether th is is correct
as a m atter of description, th is is, in itself, an im portan t
con tribution . Secon d, an d perh aps m ost im portan tly, th is
accoun t effectively stresses th at th e political bran ch es of
govern m en t are com peten t and m otivated to en gage in
con stitution al in terpretation . Th is is an im provem en t on m an y
con ven tion al th eories of con stitution al interpretation (and even
m an y th eories of dialogue), w h ich rest on th e em pirically
con ten tious assum ption th at th e political bran ch es are n ot
sufficiently m otivated to give adequate atten tion to issues of
prin ciple, n or in stitution ally capable of en gagin g in prin cipled
con stitution al interpretation .107
Coordin ate con struction also does a better job of
rebuttin g con cern s about th e dem ocratic legitim acy of judicial
review th an th e theories of judicial m eth od surveyed in th e
previous Part.108 Particularly in its descriptive dim en sion s, by
dem onstratin g th at th e judiciary often does n ot h ave th e fin al
103
See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 31, at 279 (“Judicial review fits our
con stitution al system because w e like to fragm en t pow er. We feel safer w ith checks
an d balan ces . . . .”).
104
DEVINS, supra n ote 95, at 1$2; DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 29, at 235
(“[H]ydraulic pressures w ith in th e political system m ake th e Con stitution m ore
en durin g an d stable.”).
105
See, e.g., DEVINS & FISHER, supra n ote 29, at ch s. 3-9 (describin g the
process of coordin ate con struction in diverse con stitution al areas, in cludin g federalism ,
th e w ar pow er, privacy an d race).
10$
See, e.g., KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 5 (1999);
Louis Fish er, Constitutional Interpretation by M em bers of Congress, $3 N.C. L. REV.
707 (1985); Scott E. Gan t, Judicial Suprem acy and N onjudicial Interpretation of the
Constitution, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q . 359 (1997) (discussing “n on judicial
con stitution al in terpretation ”).
107
See supra notes 53-57 an d accom pan yin g text.
108
See supra Part III.A.
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w ord on constitution al questions, th is account largely displaces
coun term ajoritarian con cern s.109 No m atter w h at form of
adjudication th e Court un dertakes, its decision s are subject to
th e political process an d to con tin ued ch eckin g an d political
revision.
Despite th ese positive con tributions, coordin ate
con struction ultim ately fails to provide either a satisfactory
descriptive or n orm ative accoun t of con stitution al dialogue. As
a m atter of description, Devin s an d Fish er seem to un derstate
th e dialogic role of th e judiciary. In an alyzin g th e dialogue
prom pted by R oe v. W ade,110 for exam ple, Devin s describes the
“in stitution al tugs an d pulls” th at took place betw een various
con stitution al actors.111
Each bran ch of govern m en t had
differen t view s about th e con troversy, and “pushed an d
in fluen ced” th e others about its view s. Non eth eless, in tim e,
th e elected branch es cam e to accept an d em brace judicially
created n orm s about abortion, w hich ultim ately set the
param eters of th e constitution al debate.112 Accordin g to Devin s,
th e Court’s view s grew to be so influen tial n ot because of an y
special con ten t of judicial decisions or an y special judicial role
in th e debate, but largely due to legislative acquiescen ce and
because th e political bran ch es seem ed to prefer th at th e Court
retain principal control over th e issue.113
It is un likely, h ow ever, th at th is description com pletely
reveals th e n ature of the Court’s in volvem ent in dialogue in the
Un ited States. Alth ough Devin s alludes to a possible educative
fun ction of th e Court in h is discussion of th e abortion
con troversy, h e does not develop th is suggestion in an y detail.114
Oth er sch olars w h o h ave exam in ed th e abortion con troversy, in
con trast, h ave n ot been so reticen t about describin g addition al

109

See FISHER, supra n ote 31, at 273 (“It is th is process of give and take an d
m utual respect th at perm its th e un elected Court to function in a dem ocratic society.”).
110
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
111
DEVINS, supra note 95, at 137; see also Devin s & Fisher, Judicial
E xclusivity, supra n ote 95, at 85 (“The tugs an d pulls of politics . . . m ake the
Con stitution m ore relevan t an d m ore durable.”).
112
DEVINS, supra n ote 95, at 148 (“Without question , the Court has set th e
param eters of elected-governm en t decision -m akin g.”).
113
See, e.g., id. at 145, 152; see also DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 29, at 235
(“Alth ough the Court [in Casey] sign aled its in creased w illingness to uphold abortion
regulations, state law m akers (fearin g a backlash from pro-choice voters) h ave typically
steered clear of the abortion issue.”).
114
DEVINS, supra n ote 95, at 149 (“Th e executive, legislative and judicial
bran ches are engaged in an on goin g dialogue, w ith each branch ch eckin g (an d perh aps
educating) the others.”).
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judicial con tributions to th at dialogue. Th ese com m entators
claim th at alth ough the Court’s w ord h as, over tim e, resolved
th e abortion con troversy to a large exten t (or at least stabilized
it), judicial decision s h ave also served to facilitate broader
con stitution al debate by draw in g various interested groups in
society in to th e discussion , an d sh apin g th e con tent of th e
debate th at con tin ues to take place.115 Furth erm ore, evidence
suggests th at the abortion debate did n ot on ly in volve differen t
con stitution al actors strugglin g again st each oth er. In stead,
th e differen t bran ch es of governm en t includin g th e Court,
togeth er w ith th e people, w ere educated by th e dialogic in put of
each oth er, leadin g to substan tive m odification of th eir
position s an d further con stitution al ch an ge over tim e as th e
parties adapted th eir view s.11$ Th is com petin g description of
th e abortion debate suggests th at th e Court plays a m ore
substan tive role in con stitution al dialogue th an coordin ate
con struction theorists recogn ize.
A secon d, and m ore dam agin g, critique of coordin ate
con struction relates to its com petitive vision of constitution al
dialogue.
Th e th eory’s focus on m utual com petition for
con stitution al m ean in g, due to th e central position of ch ecks
an d balan ces in th e th eory, suggests th at con sen sus is on ly
ach ieved once th e political process h as run its course. In th e
result, w h ich ever branch is th e stron gest in stitution ally on a
particular con stitutional issue w ill prevail in th e battle for
con stitution al m ean in g or, at th e least, th e oth er participan ts
in th e dialogue w ill acquiesce to th at bran ch ’s view s.117 The
ultim ate goal of con stitution al dialogue on th is un derstandin g
is to reach better, m ore durable and w idely accepted answ ers
about constitution al m ean in g. Accordin g to Devin s an d Fish er,
th e m ore com petin g voices in volved, th e m ore likely it is th at
th is goal w ill be ach ieved.118
115
See Friedm an, D ialogue and JudicialR eview , supra n ote 27, at $58-$8 an d
referen ces con tain ed therein. In relation to Friedm an ’s account of dialogue, see infra
Part III.B.3.
11$
See, e.g., Friedm an, D ialogue and Judicial R eview , supra note 27, at $$3
(“Th is process can h ardly be described exclusively as th e Court speakin g an d the
legislatures listen in g. Th e Court un doubtedly w as educated alon g the w ay, as to both
th e types of regulation th at m ight occur an d the in ten sity of popular opin ion.”); see also
infra Part III.B.3.
117
See, e.g., DEVINS & FISHER, supra n ote 29, at 23$ (“Attain in g an
equilibrium . . . require[s] all bran ches an d all levels of governm en t to do battle w ith
one another.”).
118
See, e.g., DEVINS, supra n ote 95, at 1$2 (“[T]h e m ore actors are interpretin g
th e Con stitution an d buttin g heads w ith each other, the better.”).
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It is question able, h ow ever, w h eth er a system of m utual
com petition for con stitution al m ean in g is really th e best w ay to
ach ieve en durin g and w idely supported an sw ers about
con stitution al m ean in g. If parties m erely fight for th eir view s
to be accepted an d the stron gest party w ins, it seem s m ore
likely th at acquiescen ce rath er th an en durin g agreem ent w ill
be th e result. In con trast, reachin g stable an d m ore w idely
accepted an sw ers seem s m ore feasible if th e differen t parties to
dialogue actively discuss th eir view s an d learn from on e
an oth er’s perspectives.
Con ceivin g of th e judiciary as sim ply adding an oth er
com petitive voice to con stitution al dialogue also seem s to be a
th in reed on w h ich to justify judicial in volvem en t, as it does n ot
explain an y distin ctive or un ique judicial con tribution th at
adds som ethin g substan tive to th e sh ared elaboration of
con stitution al m ean in g.119 If judges are just an oth er voice,120
th en arguably th is role could better be perform ed by a n on judicial an d possibly m ore dem ocratic in stitution or ran ge of
in stitutions w ith in society. We are therefore left w ith th e n eed
to fin d a th eory th at proposes som e in stitutionally un ique role
th at judges perform in dialogue th at assists in ach ievin g better
results.
2.

Th eories of Judicial Prin ciple

In con trast to coordin ate construction, w h ich proposes
n o special role for the judiciary in con stitution al dialogue,
positive theories of judicial principle propose th at judges
perform a un ique dialogic function based on th eir special
in stitution al com petence in relation to m atters of principle.
Som e sch olars claim that dialogue is gen erated as a result of
th e political branch es ch eckin g th e prin cipled in terpretation s of
th e Court in the even t of judicial error. Oth ers dow n play th e
role of th e political ch ecks on th e Court, an d in stead focus on
h ow dialogue em erges th rough th e legislative articulation of
119
Devin s an d Fish er h ave m ore recen tly claim ed th at each party to
con stitution al dialogue h as “un ique stren gth s an d w eaknesses” an d m ay h ave un ique
perspectives on con stitution al issues, based largely on the idea th at judges an d
politician s “som etim es react[] differen tly to social an d political forces.” DEVINS &
FISHER, supra note 29, at 234, 238. They do not develop th ese poin ts in detail. If th ey
did, it m ay be th at their view s w ill sh ift furth er alon g th e con tinuum of dialogue
th eories an d aw ay from a coordin ate con struction approach.
120
See, e.g., MANFREDI, supra note 3$, at 199 (arguin g th at the Court sim ply
“add[s] an oth er thoughtful voice to th e con tin uin g public debate about the prin ciples by
w h ich w e should be govern ed”).
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policy objectives w h en th e legislature respon ds to judicial
decision s. Non eth eless, due to the w ay in w h ich th ese th eories
privilege th e judicial role, th ey are also n orm atively deficien t
because th ey ultim ately result in top-dow n descriptions of
legislative acquiescence to judicial pronoun cem ents of
prin ciple.
a.

Principle and PoliticalChecks on the Court

Alexan der Bickel w as th e first con stitution al th eorist to
propose an account of dialogue th at w as based on a strong
judicial role in relation to prin ciple.121 Bickel con sidered th at
th e judiciary h as a special ability to preserve, protect, an d
defend prin ciple due to its political insulation an d th e
“m arvelous m ystery of tim e” th at com es from con siderin g th e
con stitution ality of legislation in th e con text of con crete cases,
w h ich gives courts th e capacity for “‘sober secon d th ough t.’”122
In order to iden tify an d extract th e deep an d en durin g
con stitution al prin ciples valued by society, h e coun seled th at
judges sh ould im m erse th em selves in th e h istorical tradition s
of society an d in th e “th ough t an d vision of th e ph ilosoph ers
an d th e poets.”123 Bickel recogn ized, h ow ever, th at Con gress
an d th e political bran ch es of governm en t m ay be better
situated to determ in e fun dam en tal societal values in m an y
circum stances, given th eir relative proxim ity to th e people.
Accordin gly, judges sh ould seek to declare prin ciples th at w ill
gain gen eral an d w idespread acceptan ce in th e foreseeable
future. In th is educative role, “[t]h e Court is a leader of
opin ion , n ot a m ere register of it.”124
Alth ough Bickel considered th at judges are better
situated to be a “voice of reason ” th an the political bran ch es, h e
w as also receptive to th e fact th at “elem en ts of explosion ” an d
violen t political backlash can lead to th e defeat of judicial
decision s w ith w h ich society stron gly disagrees.125 As discussed
previously, th is m ay lead th e judiciary to em ploy th e “passive
121

See generally BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 9.
Id. at 25-2$, 188, 2$1 (quotin g Justice Stone).
123
Id. at 23$.
124
Id. at 239.
125
See id. at 244-72 (describin g the Southern opposition to Brow n v. Board of
E ducation an d th e judicial strategies used to reduce political backlash ); see also
BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 91 (1978) [h erein after
BICKEL, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS] (“Th e effectiveness of the judgm en t [of th e Suprem e
Court] un iversalized depen ds on con sen t an d adm in istration.”).
122
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virtues,” such as stan din g, m ootn ess, an d the political question
doctrin e, in order to avoid prin cipled judgm ent on conten tious
social issues.12$ In other circum stances, th e judiciary can, and
does, use th e altern ative strategy of provoking an d prom ptin g
th e oth er bran ches of govern m en t to consider its view s about
prin ciple. It does so by en gagin g th em and th e people in
“dialogues an d ‘responsive readin gs’” about th e m ean in g of
con stitution al values.127 Altern atively, con versation s can be
com m en ced by th e political bran ch es, th ough such dialogues
m ay be “less polite” given th ey do n ot begin from a position of
prin ciple.128
Bickel’s dialogic legacy is eviden t in a n um ber of
con tem porary th eories of con stitution al dialogue, popular in
both th e Un ited States an d Can ada, w hich propose a sim ilar
role for the judiciary in relation to questions of principle.129
Mich ael Perry, for exam ple, portrays th e form of prin ciple th at
judges iden tify in self-con sciously m oral-political term s,
describin g the fun ction of judges as “proph etic; it is to call th e
Am erican people . . . to provision al judgm ent.”130 In perform ing
th is proph etic function, Perry argues th at the judiciary is both
12$

See supra Part III.A.3.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 9, at 20$; see also id.
at 240 (discussing the Court’s “con tin uin g colloquy w ith th e political in stitution s an d
w ith society at large”).
128
Id. at 239.
129
In th e Un ited States, Mich ael Perry h as been the prin cipal proponen t of
th is view of dialogue. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS ch . 4 (1982) [h erein after PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION]; MICHAEL J.
PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS (1994); Mich ael J. Perry, The Constitution,
The Courts and the Q uestion of M inim alism , 88 NW. U. L. REV. 84 (1993) [h erein after
Perry, M inim alism ]; Mich ael J. Perry, Protecting H um an R ights in a D em ocracy:W hat
R ole for the Courts?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. $35 (2003) [h ereinafter Perry, Protecting
H um an R ights]. Sim ilar theories of con stitution al dialogue h ave been proposed by
Joh n Agresto, Paul Dim on d an d Stan ley In gber. See, e.g., AGRESTO, supra n ote 91;
PAUL R. DIMOND, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL CHOICE (1989); Stan ley In gber,
Judging W ithout Judgm ent: Constitutional Irrelevancies and the D em ise of D ialogue,
4$ RUTGERS L. REV. 1473 (1994). Support for th is m odel in the Can adian con text is
foun d in Perry, Protecting H um an R ights, supra, an d in the w ork of Paul Weiler. See
Paul C. Weiler, R ights and Judges in a D em ocracy: A N ew Canadian V ersion, 18 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 51, $0-$1 (1984) [h erein after Weiler, R ights and Judges]; Paul C.
Weiler, O fJudges and R ights, or Should Canada H ave a ConstitutionalBillofR ights?,
$0 DALHOUSIE REV. 205 (1980) [h erein after Weiler, O fJudges and R ights].
130
PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, supra n ote 129, at 98-99. Joh n Agresto speaks
in th e gran dest fash ion about th e Court’s role in con stitution al dialogue based on its
ability to consider questions of prin ciple, w hen h e describes “its poten tial to help us
apply an d develop our fun dam en tal prin ciples an d constitutional com m an ds, [an d] its
ability . . . to h elp brin g our ph ilosophy to bear on our action s, to w ork out our presen t
an d our future in term s of our in h eritan ce from the past.” AGRESTO, supra n ote 91, at
15$-57; see also In gber, supra note 129, at 1541-43 (describin g a preem inen t dialogic
role for the judiciary in relation to prin ciple).
127
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forw ard-lookin g an d backw ard-lookin g; in oth er w ords, it
“resolves m oral problem s n ot sim ply by lookin g backw ard to
th e sedim en t of old m oralities, but ah ead to em ergen t
prin ciples in term s of w h ich fragm en ts of a n ew m oral order
can be forged.”131 As a m atter of com parative in stitutional
com peten ce, th e judiciary is best suited to perform th is fun ction
because of its insulation from th e vagaries of politics, and
because no oth er institution of govern m ent regularly deals w ith
m oral issues in a prophetic w ay.132
Wh ile th e judiciary is described as the in stitution m ost
likely to m ake superior pronoun cem en ts in relation to
prin ciple, th ese th eorists accept th at judges can som etim es
en gage in “false prophecy.”133 In order to solve th is problem ,
th ey provide a description of a dialectical system of review th at
allow s th e judiciary’s m istakes to be corrected by a system of
political ch ecks. Accordin g to Perry, th e m ost sign ifican t
source of political con trol in th e United States is th e pow er of
Con gress to lim it th e Suprem e Court’s appellate jurisdiction.134
Oth er poten tial political ch ecks in clude the ability of Con gress
to rew rite voided legislation , its ability to circum scribe th e
h oldin g of decisions in order to restrict their effects, the
possibility of constitution al am en dm en ts or th e appoin tm en t of
n ew Justices to th e Court, or, in a m ore specific context,
Con gress’s ability to propose its ow n view s about con stitution al
in terpretation and en forcem en t un der section 5 of th e
Fourteen th Am en dm en t.135 Th e relevan t political ch eck in
Can ada, in con trast, is th e section 33 override con tain ed in th e
Can adian Ch arter.13$ Th is m ech an ism , w h ich is gen erally
131

PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, supra n ote 129, at 111.
See id. at 102 (“[T]h e politically in sulated federal judiciary is m ore
likely . . . to m ove us in th e direction of a righ t an sw er (assum in g th ere is such a th in g)
th an is th e political process left to its ow n devices, w h ich ten ds to resolve such issues
by reflexive, m ech an ical referen ce to established m oral con ven tion s.”).
133
Id. at 115.
134
Perry rejects oth er sources of political con trol over th e judiciary, such as
th e im peachm en t process, con stitution al am en dm ent, th e appoin tm en ts process, an d
budgetary con trol of the federal judiciary, as insufficien t to ch eck th e Court. See id. at
12$-28.
135
See AGRESTO, supra note 91, at 12$-31; see also DIMOND, supra n ote 129, at
4 (suggestin g m ore general an d w idespread checks on th e Court “either by acquiescin g
in the rulin g or by fram in g a differen t un derstan din g, w hether by legislation ,
argum ent before the Court or in other public aren as, our con duct, the appoin tm en t of
n ew Justices, or con stitution al am en dm en t”).
13$
See Perry, M inim alism , supra n ote 129, at 155-5$; Perry, Protecting
H um an R ights, supra note 129, at $$$-$7, $77 n .107; Weiler, R ights and Judges, supra
n ote 129, at 79-84. Wh ile Perry con siders th at section 33 of th e Can adian Ch arter
en ables th is form of constitution al dialogue in th at coun try, h e n o lon ger claim s th at
132
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regarded as a m ore effective ch eck th an th ose available in th e
Un ited States, en ables Can adian courts to perform th eir
valuable role of speakin g to issues of prin ciple, w h ile at th e
sam e tim e reservin g an “escape valve” or “fin al say” for th e
legislature, “to be used sparin gly in th e exception al case w h ere
th e judiciary h as gone aw ry.”137
Th eorists of judicial prin ciple argue th at th e
com bin ation of th ese ch ecks in differen t system s results in
judicial rulin gs th at are provision al, th ereby in itiatin g an
on goin g dialogue about constitution al m ean in g.138 First, the
electorally accoun table bran ch es of govern m ent m ake a policy
ch oice about a given issue. Th e court w ill then evaluate th at
policy choice and eith er accept or reject it on prin cipled
groun ds. Fin ally, if th e court rejects th e policy ch oice, th e
political bran ch es m ay respon d to th at decision eith er “by
toleratin g it, or, if th e decision is n ot accepted, or accepted
fully, by m oderatin g or even by un doin g it,” th rough th e use of
political ch ecks.139 As a result of this dialectical process, and
due to th e court’s prin cipled role w ith in th is process, “w h at
em erges is a far m ore self-critical political m orality th an w ould
oth erw ise appear, an d th erefore likely a m ore m ature political
m orality as w ell . . . th at is m ovin g (in chin g*) tow ard . . . righ t
an sw ers.”140
Sim ilar to oth er structural th eories, th is con ception of
dialogue is successful in displacin g m an y dem ocratic legitim acy
con cerns, due to its recogn ition th at judicial decisions are
subject to dem ocratic revision an d response. Perry also claim s
th at the theory solves som e of th e dem ocratic costs
tradition ally associated w ith judicial review , as th e ability of
th e legislature to respon d to judicial decision s sign ifican tly
en h an ces th e “political capacity” of th e people an d en courages
th is kin d of dialogue is possible in th e Un ited States because he does not con sider th at
th e ch ecks in place are sufficien t to con strain th e judiciary. See Perry, Protecting
H um an R ights, supra note 129, at $73-7$.
137
Weiler, R ights and Judges, supra n ote 129, at 79, 84. Th is is con sisten t
w ith the view s of th e negotiators of the Ch arter. See supra note 34 an d accom pan yin g
text.
138
See DIMOND, supra note 129, at 4 (statin g th at as a result of these checks,
judicial rulin gs becom e “provision al rulin gs th at in itiate an on goin g dialogue w ith th e
people”).
139
PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, supra n ote 129, at 112.
140
Id. at 113; see also AGRESTO, supra n ote 91, at 10 (“[C]on stitution al
in terpretation is not an d w as never in ten ded to be solely w ith in th e province of th e
Court, for con stitution al governm en t im plies . . . the in teractive un derstan ding of th e
people, th eir represen tatives an d th eir judges.”).
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“greater citizen participation in . . . ‘the conversation about
con stitution al m ean in g.’”141 Furth erm ore, this m odel is an
im provem en t on coordin ate construction because it proposes a
un ique con tribution that th e judiciary m akes to constitution al
dialogue.
Th is account of dialogue n on eth eless suffers from a
ran ge of difficulties con cern in g the precise fun ction th at it
assigns to th e judiciary, an d th e process by w h ich th e political
bran ch es can respon d to judicial rulin gs. Th ese difficulties
arise from th e fact th at th e th eory rests on em pirically dubious
assum ption s about judicial an d legislative com peten ces, rath er
th an a m ore factually groun ded explan ation of in stitution al
in teraction s betw een differen t constitution al actors.142 First,
th e claim th at judges h ave superior abilities in relation to
m atters of prin ciple is difficult to support em pirically. As
previously observed in relation to fun dam ental righ ts theories
of in terpretation ,143 given th e existen ce of pervasive and
in tractable disagreem en t about the m ean in g of righ ts, it is
un realistic to expect th at judges can resolve such “h ard
questions” in a w ay th at fin ally settles righ ts claim s.144 Judicial
review th at is prem ised on th e superior m oral reason in g of
judges also can n ot be recon ciled w ith dem ocratic values m ore
broadly, because it suggests th at elitist rule is preferable to
leavin g decisions in th e h an ds of th e people’s represen tatives.
Most scholars w h o favor th is understandin g of dialogue
n on eth eless argue th at judges rem ain better suited to decide
m atters of prin ciple due to th eir com parative in stitution al
com peten ces. In particular, th ey claim that th e political
in sulation of th e judiciary protects courts from th e kind of selfin terested beh avior that is th ough t to n egatively affect th e
deliberation s of political actors, w h ich leaves judges w ith a
com parative advan tage as m oral deliberators.145 Th is claim ,
141
Perry, Protecting H um an R ights, supra n ote 129, at $91-92 (quotin g
San ford Levin son, The A udience for Constitutional M eta-Theory (O r, W hy, and to
W hom , D o I W rite the Things I D o?), $3 U. COLO. L. REV. 389, 407 (1992)).
142
Ferejohn an d Kram er m ake a sim ilar criticism of Bickel: “Bickel’s an alysis
con sisted m ore of exhortation th an an y kin d of in stitutional explan ation of an
observable phenom enon.” John A. Ferejoh n an d Larry D. Kram er, Independent
Judges, D ependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial R estraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
9$2, 978 n.31 (2002).
143
See supra Part II.A.
144
See WALDRON, supra note 15, at 12 (“Th e issues that righ ts
im plicate . . . are sim ply h ard question s – m atters on w h ich reason able people differ.”).
145
See, e.g., PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, supra n ote 129, at 102 (“As a m atter
of com parative in stitution al com petence, the politically in sulated federal judiciary is
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h ow ever, rests on em pirically question able claim s about both
judicial an d legislative beh avior.14$ In relation to th e political
bran ch es, th ese th eorists assert th at legislatures are too selfin terested to adequately deliberate on issues of m oral prin ciple,
but th ey provide n o factual support for such claim s. As
discussed earlier in relation to advice-giving th eories, th is
claim rests on con troversial em pirical assum ption s about
political beh avior an d legislative deliberation .147 Sim ilarly,
claim s th at th e judiciary h as in stitutional advan tages in
relation to th e consideration of prin ciple rest on idealized
assum ption s about h ow judges decide cases. Even a brief
h istorical overview suggests th at th ese assertion s m erely rest
on th e “h ope” th at judicial review offers, given th at courts h ave
n ot alw ays been th e institution of governm en t to protect righ ts
best.148 In deed, in h is later w ork, Bickel him self m oved aw ay
from th e idea th at judges h ave a special ability to decide cases
on th e basis of prin ciple, due to w hat h e perceived to be
sign ificant failures of the Court in th is regard.149
If w e consider th e w ritten opin ion s of judges in greater
detail, it also becom es clear th at th ey are n ot alw ays, perh aps
n ot even often , rem arkable exam ples of m oral deliberation.
Rath er th an centerin g on con sideration s of political m orality,
judicial decision s are m ore com m on ly based on purely legal
groun ds, reflectin g th e cen trality of doctrin al argum en t to th e
judicial task.150 Furth erm ore, even w h en in dividual justices
con sider issues of prin ciple in th e con text of a particular case,
th ey m ust ultim ately overcom e disagreem en t w ith oth er
m ore likely, w hen the hum an righ ts issue is a deeply con troversial one, to m ove us in
th e direction of a righ t an sw er . . . th an is the political process . . . .”).
14$
Th e argum en t th at decision s about righ ts should be given to judges as a
result of th eir in sulation from self-in terest also con tradicts other epistem ic precepts,
such as the prin ciple th at such decision s should be m ade by actors w ho h ave a
sufficien t stake in th e m atter to decide in a respon sible m an ner. See WALDRON, supra
n ote 15, at 253.
147
See supra notes 53-57 an d accom pan yin g text.
148
On th e tw in n arratives of th e “h ope” an d “th reat” of judicial review in
con stitution al sch olarsh ip, see Barry Friedm an, The Im portance of Being Positive:The
N ature and Xunction of Judicial R eview , 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 12$7-70 (2004)
[h erein after Friedm an , The Im portance ofBeing Positive].
149
ALEX ANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 3-5 (1975) (suggestin g
th at judges m erely im pose person al values w h en decidin g cases); see also BICKEL, THE
IDEA OF PROGRESS, supra note 125, at 179.
150
See Jerem y Waldron, E isgruber’s H ouse of Lords, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 89, 103
(2002) (“Th e opin ion s of th e Court are paragon s perh aps of den se an d com plex doctrin al
argum ent, an d often th ey in volve pyrotech n ic displays of ill-tem per on question s of
in terpretive strategy of the justices. But they are risible as exam ples of m oral
deliberation.”).
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justices on th e Court about th e outcom e, typically by w ay of
com prom ise or by vote. Con sideration s of m oral prin ciple are
likely to be m odified or diluted as a result of th is n ecessity for
com prom ise. Wh ile th ese features of th e judicial role m ay
support th e argum ent th at judges face few er in cen tives to act
purely on th e basis of self-interest, th ey do n ot support th e
claim th at prin ciple w ill be m ore adequately dealt w ith in th e
judicial rather th an th e legislative branch , n or th at m ore
prin cipled answ ers w ill be reach ed as a result of judicial
participation in constitution al dialogue.151
Th e stron gest critique of th is accoun t of dialogue is th at
it con tains an overw h elm in g in tern al con tradiction .152 Th is has
tw o dim ensions. First, if th e judiciary is in deed th e superior
in stitution to deliberate on issues of prin ciple, w h y sh ould th e
political branch es of govern m en t be trusted to correct judicial
m istakes* If on e begins w ith th e assum ption th at th e political
bran ch es are prim arily m otivated by expedien cy rath er th an
prin ciple, as th ese th eorists do, th en it is difficult to justify w h y
political actors should be able to overturn judicial decisions
th at are groun ded in prin ciple. Th e m ost com m on reason th ese
sch olars propose is th at political oversigh t is required to guard
again st th e possibility of judicial m istake. How ever, th is raises
th e secon d dim ension of th e con tradiction in th ese th eories: if
th e political bran ch es are able to overturn decisions th at are
reach ed by judicial error, th en an overarch in g th eory of
in terpretation is still required to objectively determ in e those
cases in w h ich th e judiciary h as actually fallen in to error. As
discussed previously, no adequate objective in terpretive th eory
curren tly exists to assist in th is task.153
Th e claim th at courts h ave com parative institution al
com peten ce in relation to prin ciple also un derm ines th e
argum en t th at th is accoun t solves som e of the dem ocratic costs
associated w ith judicial review . Alth ough judicial decision s can
be ch allen ged by th e political bran ches of govern m en t, if w e
accept th at courts h ave superior decision -m akin g abilities in
relation to prin ciple, it is likely th at legislatures w ill defer to
judicial interpretations on th ese m atters rath er th an m ake
th eir ow n in dependen t judgm en ts. Legislators m ay th en com e
151
See id. at 10$; DEVINS & FISHER, supra n ote 29, at 22$ (“A m ultim em ber
Court, like other parts of govern m en t, gropes in crem en tally tow ard con sen sus an d
decision th rough com prom ise, expedien cy, an d ad hoc action s.”).
152
See, e.g., PERETTI, supra n ote 32, at $9-71.
153
See supra Part II.A.1.
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to rely on judges to con sider con stitution al problem s w ith
legislation at a later date, rath er th an con sider th ese m atters
for th em selves at th e tim e of en actm ent. Th e com bin ation of
th ese critiques m eans th at w e are left w ith yet an oth er
n orm atively deficien t accoun t of con stitution al dialogue.
b.

Principle and Legislative Articulation ofPolicy

Rath er th an focus on th e role of th e legislature in
placin g political ch ecks on th e Court, oth er theories of judicial
prin ciple stress th at th e legislative branch adds som ethin g
substan tive to con stitution al dialogue due to its un ique voice
an d com parative in stitution al com peten ce in relation to policy
m akin g.154 Legislative policy m akin g is a com plex process,
w h ich requires legislators to con sider h ow m ultiple, com petin g
objectives can best be ach ieved an d to m ake difficult
predictions about th e im pact of particular policies on differen t
social actors.155 Given th e un ique legislative expertise in
relation to such issues, dialogue about constitution al m ean in g
em erges w h en the legislature responds to the judiciary in a
w ay th at respects judicial pron oun cem en ts of principle, but
w h ich also allow s th e legislature to articulate th e im portance of
its w ider policy objectives.15$

154
Wh ile Perry acknow ledges th at th e political bran ch es h ave com parative
in stitution al com petence in relation to policy m aking, h e does not explicitly build th is
in to h is th eory of dialogue, in stead conceivin g of th e legislative con tribution to
con stitution al dialogue as on e of placin g ch ecks on th e Court. See supra Part III.B.2.i.
155
See, e.g., JANET L. HIEBERT, DEP’T OF JUST., CAN., ENRICHING
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE: VIEWING PARLIAMENT’S ROLE AS BOTH PROACTIVE AND
REACTIVE 7-8 (2000), available at http://w w w .justice.gc.ca/en /ps/rs/rep/2000/rp20027.pdf. [h erein after HIEBERT, ENRICHING CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE]. Th is reflects the
distin ction th e Legal Process Sch ool m ade betw een judicial prin ciple an d legislative
policy m aking as a w ay of con strain ing judicial discretion w ith in acceptable
boun daries. See Dorf, supra note 1, at 920-29.
15$
Th is version of dialogue theory can be h elpfully con trasted w ith Rich ard
Fallon’s theory of “im plem en tin g th e Con stitution .” See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.,
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001). Accordin g to Fallon , th e Court h as a
com parative advan tage to the political in stitution s of govern m en t in con siderin g
question s of prin ciple. Id. at 10-11, 40. How ever, w h ile the Court is an im portan t
forum of principle, it is n ot only a forum of prin ciple, since in th e con text of reason able
disagreem en t it m ust m ake a variety of practical calculation s in order to successfully
im plem en t the Con stitution . Id. at 3$. Im plem en tation of th e Con stitution is a
collective fun ction th at is also en gaged in by th e other in stitution s of govern m en t an d,
in deed, the prim ary respon sibility of im plem en tin g th e Con stitution rests on the
political branches. Id. at 37, 39. As a result of th is, despite the Court’s special role in
relation to principle, its overall constitution al function is best described in term s of
im plem en tation rather th an in terpretation due to the fact th at it n ecessarily operates
w ith in “a sh ared project of con stitution al im plem en tation.” Id. at 41.
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Th is th eory of dialogue h as becom e extrem ely popular
w ith in Can adian con stitution al th eory in recen t years, due to
th e com bin ed contribution s of Peter Hogg and Alison Bush ell,
an d Kent Roach.157 In deed, Hogg an d Bush ell’s accoun t is often
regarded as the sem in al explan ation of dialogue un der the
Can adian Ch arter.158 Wh ile th e th eory as curren tly described
by th ese sch olars is accordin gly tied to th e structural features
of th e Ch arter, w e w ill see th at its description of dialogic
dyn am ics could also have explan atory or n orm ative pow er in
th e Un ited States.
Sim ilar to th e th eories of judicial principle considered in
th e previous section , th is accoun t of dialogue begin s w ith th e
assertion th at th e judiciary h as a un ique ability to provide a
stron g voice in relation to prin ciple. Ken t Roach is m ost
explicit about th is,159 describin g h ow th e Court “starts the
con versation ” w ith th e legislature about Ch arter values w h en
it decides a case, an d in doin g so, “draw [s] th e atten tion of th e
legislature an d society to fun dam en tal values.”1$0 Roach does
n ot claim th at courts w ill alw ays reach th e righ t an sw ers about
prin ciple. Nevertheless, h e does con sider th at th e judiciary h as
special institution al expertise to interpret righ ts and consider
m atters of prin ciple due to its relative political in sulation.1$1

157
See ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra n ote 4; Hogg & Bush ell,
D ialogue, supra note 4; Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Thorn ton, R eply to “Six D egrees of
D ialogue,” 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 529 (1999) [herein after Hogg & Thorn ton , R eply];
Roach, D ialogues, supra note 4; see also Ken t Roach , A m erican Constitutional Theory
for Canadians (and the R est of the W orld), 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 503 (2002); Roach ,
D ialogic JudicialR eview , supra n ote $.
158
Most academ ic com m en tators w h o discuss th e dialogue m etaphor in the
Can adian con text begin w ith Hogg & Bush ell’s an alysis. See, e.g., Jean Leclair,
Judicial R eview in Canadian Constitutional Law : A Brief O verview , 3$ GEO. WASH.
INT’L L. REV. 543, 547-50 (2004); Leigh ton McDon ald, R ights, ‘D ialogue’ and
D em ocratic O bjections to JudicialR eview , 32 FED. L. REV. 1, 1-$ (2004).
159
Hogg an d Bush ell focus less atten tion on describing th e judicial role in
dialogue, as their principal in terest is in exam in in g “legislative sequels” follow in g
judicial n ullification of statutes, in order to support their em pirical claim s th at
dialogue is an in stitution al feature of con stitution al review under th e Ch arter. See
Hogg & Bushell, D ialogue, supra n ote 4, at 79-81, 9$-98. Nonetheless, their accoun t of
dialogue con tain s th e clear assum ption th at judges h ave a special role to play in the
dialogue about the m ean in g of Ch arter values in relation to prin ciple. See, e.g., id. at
79 (suggesting th at legislative responses sh ould be “properly respectful of the Charter
values th at h ave been iden tified by the Court”).
1$0
ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra note 4, at 285; Roach,
D ialogues, supra n ote 4, at 484.
1$1
See, e.g., ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra n ote 4, at 285 (“Th e
Court, is th e on e th at m ust in itiate the conversation , because the principles of fairn ess,
fun dam en tal freedom s, an d respect for the rights of m in orities are ones th at are likely
to be ign ored or finessed in the legislative an d adm in istrative processes.”).
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Alth ough th e judiciary is regarded as h avin g a stron g
role to play in judicial review on the basis of prin ciple, th e
legislature can m ake its ow n un ique con tribution s to
con stitution al un derstan din g based on its com parative
in stitution al ability to assess h ow policy objectives can best be
ach ieved. Th ese th eorists th us claim th at judicial decisions
fun ction as th e beginn in g of a dialogue w ith th e political
bran ch es “as to h ow best to recon cile th e in dividualistic values
of th e Ch arter w ith th e accom plish m en t of social an d econ om ic
policies for th e ben efit of th e com m un ity as a w h ole.”1$2 Th e
judiciary h as th e prim ary role in definin g the principles laid
dow n by th e Ch arter, an d is able to assist in ach ievin g m ore
prin cipled answ ers by in jectin g considerations of prin ciple in to
con stitution al discussion s.1$3 Legislatures, on th e oth er h and,
can rem in d courts w hy lim its on righ ts m ay be required in
particular contexts, an d discuss w h y th ey m ay h ave con sidered
an d rejected oth er altern atives.1$4
Tyin g th eir accoun t to th e structural features of th e
Can adian Ch arter, these theorists regard section 1 of th e
Ch arter as th e key feature th at facilitates con stitution al
dialogue because it en ables productive discussion to take place
betw een the judicial and legislative bran ch es.1$5 Un der section
1, th e righ ts th at are guaran teed by th e Ch arter are subject to
“such reason able lim its prescribed by law as can be
dem onstrably justified in a free and dem ocratic society.”1$$
Most cases th at in volve legislation bein g struck dow n cen ter on
th e reason ableness of th e m eans th at th e legislature h as
1$2

Hogg & Bush ell, D ialogue, supra n ote 4, at 105 (em ph asis om itted).
See ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra n ote 4, at 23$-37
(arguin g th at a strong dialogic judicial role “en courage[s] judges to in ject
con sideration s of m oral principles . . . in to dem ocratic debates about the difficult issues
th at en d up in Ch arter litigation”).
1$4
See, e.g., id. at 293. Roach con siders th is form of dialogue to be a
con tin uation of the dialogue betw een courts an d legislatures th at is ach ieved un der the
com m on law . Id. at 254-$3; Roach , D ialogues, supra n ote 4, at 503-17.
1$5
Un like in m an y theories, the prin cipal focus here is not on th e section 33
override. Hogg an d Bush ell, for exam ple, say little about th is provision , m erely n otin g
th at it is “relatively un im portant” to th e developm ent of con stitution al dialogue un der
th e Ch arter due to the fact th at a political clim ate h as developed again st its use. Hogg
& Bush ell, D ialogue, supra note 4, at 83-84. Roach, in con trast, claim s th at the
override is a tool of “extraordin ary dialogue” w h ich results in a “shoutin g m atch ”
betw een courts an d legislatures an d sh ould therefore on ly be used in exception al
circum stan ces. ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra n ote 4, at 250; Roach,
D ialogues, supra note 4, at 487, 503. As to w h y th is reflects a position of legislative
acquiescen ce to judicial prin ciple, see infra n ote 174 an d accom pan yin g text.
1$$
Can adian Ch arter of Righ ts an d Freedom s, § 1, Part I of the Con stitution
Act, 1982, Bein g Schedule B to th e Can ada Act of 1982, ch . 11 (U.K.).
1$3
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ch osen to pursue a legislative objective, rath er th an th e
legislative objective itself.1$7 Debate th en centers on th e m eans
by w h ich particular policies sh ould be pursued. Th is structure
en ables legislatures to lim it righ ts accordin g to th e stan dards
th at th e Suprem e Court h as set for section 1 justification .1$8 As
a result, a “constructive an d respectful” or ordin ary dialogue
can take place betw een courts and legislatures w h ich perm its
th em “to speak in stron g but distin ct an d com plem en tary
voices.”1$9 Wh ile th e Court en gages th e legislature in relation
to question s of prin ciple, th e legislature in turn en gages th e
Court in relation to h ow policy objectives can best be ach ieved
an d w h y lim its on righ ts m ay be required in particular
con texts.
If th e Court n on eth eless decides to in validate
statutory provision s, this n eed n ot frustrate legislative agendas
because th e legislature can respon d by “devis[in g] a response
th at is properly respectful of th e Ch arter values th at h ave been
iden tified by th e Court, but w h ich accom plishes th e social or
econ om ic objectives th at th e judicial decision has im peded.”170
Wh ile th is accoun t of dialogue th at th e Can adian s
propose rests largely on section 1 of th e Ch arter, it is possible
to extrapolate its un derstandin g of dialogic dyn am ics to th e
Un ited States constitution al system .171 On th e on e h an d, it is
true th at section 1 creates a distin ct tw o-step an alytic
structure, w hich en ables th e Court to first iden tify th e
applicable righ t and th en determ in e w h eth er restrictions on
th is righ t are justified.172 Th is can be con trasted w ith the
position in th e Un ited States, w h ere th ere is n o com parable
lim itation clause in th e Con stitution an d w h ere judges in stead
1$7
See HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS, supra note $9, at 47; Hogg & Bush ell,
D ialogue, supra note 4, at 85.
1$8
Th e stan dards prescribed by R . v. O akes, [198$] S.C.R. 103, 138-40, are: (1)
th e law m ust pursue an im portan t objective; (2) th e law m ust be ration ally con nected
w ith the objective; (3) the law m ust im pair the objective n o m ore th an necessary to
accom plish th e objective; an d (4) th e law m ust not h ave a disproportion ately severe
effect on th e person s to w h om it applies.
1$9
ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra note 4, at 13.
170
Hogg & Bush ell, D ialogue, supra n ote 4, at 79-80 (em ph asis om itted). In
general term s, Hogg an d Bushell suggest th at dialogue occurs “[w ]h ere a judicial
decision is open to legislative reversal, m odification, or avoidan ce” by the legislative
process. Id. at 79.
171
Cf. ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra n ote 4, at 290 (arguin g
th at th is type of dialogue is not possible in the Un ited States because the Un ited States
Bill of Righ ts establish es “absolute” righ ts); see also id. at 15$ (describin g righ ts in th e
Un ited States as “absolute an d fin al”); id. at 292 (“[I]t is a serious m istake to lum p the
Can adian Charter w ith th e Am erican BillofR ights.”).
172
Id. at 15$.
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defin e constitution al righ ts in a sin gle step. Despite th ese
differen ces, h ow ever, it is gen erally agreed th at all righ ts
con tain ed in constitution al in strum en ts are subject to lim its.
Judicial consideration of th ese lim its in th e Un ited States
sim ply takes place at th e level of defin in g th e applicable righ t
w h en th e Suprem e Court refers to the justifications th at th e
govern m en t h as provided for its action s in legal argum ent.173
As a result, alth ough con stitution al decisions in th e Un ited
States m ay n ot h ave th e sam e structure as in Can ada, th e
political bran ch es in th e Un ited States h ave sim ilar
opportun ities to argue before the Court regardin g h ow its
policy objectives can best be ach ieved. Furth erm ore, w h en
respon din g to judicial decisions in validatin g statutory
provision s, Con gress retain s sim ilar leew ay to en act n ew
legislation in an effort to ach ieve its objectives, w h ile at the
sam e tim e takin g th e Court’s pron ouncem en ts about
con stitution al values into accoun t.
Wh ile th is con ception of dialogue offers th e legislature a
distin ctive role in respon din g to judicial decision s, a n um ber of
problem s rem ain due to th e fact th at the judiciary is still
regarded as possessin g superior abilities in relation to
prin ciple.174 First, th is accoun t is based on th e sam e n egative
assum ption s regardin g th e legislative branch, an d th e sam e
idealized accounts of th e judicial role, as oth er th eories of
dialogue based on judicial prin ciple.175 Secon d, alth ough the
th eory purports to describe substantive dialogic roles for both
th e judiciary an d th e legislature, th e n ature of constitution al

173
See Mark Tush net, JudicialA ctivism or R estraint in a Section 33 W orld, 53
U. TORONTO L.J. 89, 92 (2003) (discussin g the sim ilarities betw een righ ts defin ition
an d govern m en t justification in th e Un ited States an d Can ada) [h erein after Tush n et,
Judicial A ctivism or R estraint]. Cf. David S. Law , G eneric Constitutional Law , 89
MINN. L. REV. $52, $98 (2005) (observin g the “sheer ubiquity” of balan cin g-type tests in
con stitution al jurispruden ce in a ran ge of n ation s); Wexler, supra n ote 80, at 330
(arguin g th at in th e Un ited States con text, use of in term ediate scrutin y con stitutes a
form of balan cing w h ich allow s th e Court to “instigate a dialogue am ong itself, its
coordin ate bran ches of governm en t, an d society at large”).
174
As developed in th e Can adian con text, th e accoun t can also be criticized on
th e basis th at it does n ot explain th e use of section 33 very w ell, w h ich Roach h im self
explicitly acknow ledges. See ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra n ote 4, at
250 (“Th is respon se explains less w ell the extraordin ary dialogues th at occur w hen
legislatures an d courts en gage in shoutin g m atches an d show dow n s over w hether a
particular decision m ade by th e Court w as righ t or acceptable.”). It fails in th is regard
because incorporatin g section 33 in to an accoun t of dialogue requires an
acknow ledgem en t th at the legislature m ay en gage in its ow n prin cipled in terpretation
of Ch arter values, a m ove th at th ese th eorists are reluctant to take.
175
See supra Part III.B.2.i.
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Even th ough
dialogue rem ain s very judicial-cen tric.17$
legislatures are assign ed a substan tive role, th ere is
n on eth eless an extrem e reluctan ce to ackn ow ledge a legitim ate
role for th e political bran ch es as independent in terpreters of
con stitution al righ ts.177 Wh ile courts articulate prin ciple, the
legislative role in th e dialogue is m erely passive or reactive,
con fin ed to “m outh[in g] th e lan guage of lim its.”178 In addition,
n ot on ly do judges get to speak in th e rh etoric of righ ts, but as
a practical m atter, th ey also h ave the prim ary voice in
determ in in g w h eth er a given lim it on righ ts can be justified.
As a result, even th e legislature’s con tribution in th is area m ay
be a great deal w eaker th an th ese th eorists suggest.179
Con stitution al righ ts are th us likely to assum e “a
superordin ate im portance, resistan t to balan cing.”180
Th e subordin ate an d secon dary dialogic position of th e
legislature also raises great con cern s about th e im pact of
judicial review on legislative reason in g an d deliberation.181 Th e
risk th at legislatures w ill ch oose to adopt policies based on
w h at judges h ave said about con stitution al values in creases if
legislators are n ot con sidered to h ave a legitim ate role in
in terpretin g th ose values. In th e con text of constitution al
decision -m akin g in Canada, a n um ber of com m en tators suggest
th at th is form of dem ocratic debilitation is, in fact, occurrin g,
as legislatures w ill often sim ply insert judicially-approved
“Ch arter-speak”182 in to legislation , rath er than en gage in
deeper reflection and in dependen t deliberation about th e

17$

See, e.g., HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS, supra note $9, at 4$ (“Hogg an d
Bush ell portray Parliam ent’s role as clearly secon dary un der th e con stitution al division
of labour . . . . Th e judiciary speaks – Parliam en t listens.”).
177
See Man fredi & Kelly, supra note 95, at 523 (arguin g th at the m ost crucial
flaw in Hogg an d Bush ell’s norm ative argum en t “is its assum ption of a judicial
m on opoly on correct in terpretation ,” an d th at “[c]on trary to w hat Hogg an d Bush ell
assert, legislatures are never subordin atin g th em selves to the Charter per se, but to th e
Court’s in terpretation of the Charter’s lan guage”).
178
See Petter, supra note 38, at 19$.
179
Id. at 19$-97.
180
Jerem y Webber, Institutional D ialogue betw een Courts and Legislatures in
the D efinition of Xundam ental R ights: Lessons from Canada (and elsew here), in
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, EAST AND WEST: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE IN A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE $1, 97 (Wojciech Sadurski ed., 2002).
181
See Man fredi & Kelly, supra note 95, at 522; Tush net, JudicialA ctivism or
R estraint, supra note 173, at 94-100 (critiquin g Roach ’s conception of dialogue un der
th e Ch arter).
182
Hogg & Bush ell, D ialogue, supra n ote 4, at 101.
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Wh ile th is vision of
m ean in g of Ch arter values.183
con stitution al dialogue is an im provem ent on th e th eories of
dialogue considered th us far, due to both its description of m ore
substan tive form s of en gagem en t betw een th e branch es of
govern m en t and th e substan tive justification it provides for
judicial participation in dialogue, it ultim ately rem ains
n orm atively deficient as a th eory of dialogue due to its
con tin ued privilegin g of th e judicial role.
3.

Equilibrium Th eories

E quilibrium theories of dialogue provide an altern ative
w ay of con ceivin g of the special judicial role in con stitution al
dialogue th at does n ot privilege judicial con tribution s. In th ese
th eories, th e judge’s role is described as on e of fosterin g societyw ide con stitution al discussion th at ultim ately leads to a settled
equilibrium about constitution al m ean in g. While th is provides
a m uch m ore prom isin g account of con stitutional dialogue th an
th e th eories exam ined th us far, it ultim ately fails to provide a
com plete account of th e role of judicial review w ith in th e
con stitution al system .
Th e m ost prom in ent descriptions of constitution al
dialogue in th is vein h ave been developed by Barry Friedm an
an d by Robert Post an d Reva Siegel.184 Friedm an ’s is th e m ost
positive account, as it is explicitly groun ded in social scien ce
studies regardin g institution al in teractions betw een th e

183
See, e.g., HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS, supra n ote $9, at 222 (n otin g th at
in certain instan ces, legislative respon se to judicial decision s in Can ada h as been to
“‘Ch arter proof’ new legislation so as to address an d an ticipate th e judiciary’s specific
an d likely con cern s”); Janet L. Hiebert, Parliam entary Bills of R ights: A n A lternative
M odel?, $9 MOD. L. REV. 7, 27 (200$) (“[W]h at is occurrin g . . . is th e in troduction of
judicial in fluen ce at early stages of policy developm en t, lon g before judicial review
occurs, resultin g in the further isolation of parliam en t.”); MANFREDI, supra n ote 3$, at
180 (“Th e Court’s m onopoly over con stitution al in terpretation m ean s th at public policy
w ill alw ays be set closer to judicial preferen ces th an to legislative preferen ces.”).
184
In relation to Friedm an ’s accoun t of dialogue, see generally Friedm an,
D ialogue, supra note 27; Friedm an , The Im portance of Being Positive, supra note 148.
In relation to Post an d Siegel’s accoun t, see gen erally Robert C. Post, Xashioning the
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law , 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003)
[h erein after Post, Xashioning the Legal Constitution]; Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Xive Pow er: Policentric Interpretation of the
Xam ily and M edical Leave A ct, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003) [h erein after Post & Siegel,
Legislative Constitutionalism ]; Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism , supra note 3;
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution Xrom the People:
Juricentric R estrictions on Section Xive Pow er, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003) [h erein after Post &
Siegel, Protecting the Constitution].
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judiciary, th e political bran ch es, an d th e people.185 Th ese
studies sh ow th at w hile th e Suprem e Court h as sign ifican t
leew ay in m akin g pron oun cem ents, if it strays too far from
w h at th e oth er branch es of governm en t an d the people accept,
political con strain ts such as th e pow er of judicial appoin tm en ts
an d popular backlash w ill brin g th e Court back into line.18$
Friedm an relies on th is eviden ce principally to stress th e role of
public opin ion as on e of th e principal forces con trollin g th e
Court. Although th is m ech an ism is n ot understood perfectly,
social scien ce evidence in creasin gly suggests th at judicial
outcom es ten d to run in lin e w ith public opinion over th e lon ger
term .187
Wh ile th ese studies sh ow th at th e Court is h eavily
con strain ed, Friedm an argues th at judicial decisions still play
an im portant function in th e constitution al system as th ey
serve to spark (or con tin ue) a broader n ation al discussion about
con stitution al m ean in g.188 As a result, th e Court acts as the
sh aper and facilitator of society-w ide discussion about
con stitution al values. Wh en it declares its ow n view s about th e
m ean in g of con stitutional text, th e Court actively ch an n els an d
fosters on goin g societal debate by syn th esizin g th e various, an d
possibly disparate, view s about con stitution al m ean in g an d by
articulatin g th at debate in an explicitly con stitution al form .189
185
See Barry Friedm an, The Politics of Judicial R eview , 84 TEX . L. REV. 257
(2005) [h erein after Friedm an, Politics ofJudicialR eview ]; see also Friedm an , D ialogue,
supra n ote 27, at $71-72 (“[T]h e con strain t in dialogue is in herent an d system ic: judges
are con strain ed by the system of governm en t in w h ich they operate.”).
18$
Friedm an, D ialogue, supra note 27, at $79 & n .522 (citin g ROBERT G.
MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 224 (19$0); Robert A. Dah l, D ecisionM aking in a D em ocracy: The Suprem e Court as a N ational Policy-M aker, $ J. PUB. L.
279 (1957)). Th e political con strain ts th at operate on a Suprem e Court Justice in th e
Un ited States in clude strategic in teraction w ith other judges on a collegial court, the
pressures im posed by judges low er in th e judicial h ierarch y regardin g how decision s
are to be in terpreted, in ter-bran ch con straints w h ich result from struggles w ith th e
political branches, an d popular opin ion regarding con stitutional m ean in g an d the
practice of judicial review . See Friedm an, Politics of Judicial R eview , supra note 185,
at 270-329 an d the social science references referred to th erein .
187
Friedm an, The Im portance of Being Positive, supra note 148, at 1295 (“In
th e lon g run , as popular opin ion sh ifts, judicial decision s an d ultim ately con stitution al
m ean in g sh ift w ith it.”).
See generally Barry Friedm an , M ediated Popular
Constitutionalism , 101 MICH. L. REV. 259$, 2$13-29 (2003) [h erein after Friedm an,
M ediated Popular Constitutionalism ] (explorin g the exten t to w h ich public opin ion can,
an d does, serve as a m on itor of judicial activity); Friedm an , Politics ofJudicialR eview ,
supra note 185 (sam e).
188
Friedm an, D ialogue, supra note 27, at $54 (“The Court m ay offer an
in terpretation th at is operative for a tim e, but th e Court’s opinion s lead debate on a
path th at often ultim ately ch anges th at in terpretation.”).
189
See, e.g., id. at $$8-71 (describin g th e various roles of the judiciary in
con stitution al dialogue).
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In th e process, th e Court also m ediates th e view s of differen t
participan ts in the debate an d focuses th e term s in w h ich
future debate m igh t proceed. Th e Court’s decisions th en
facilitate furth er debate, eith er by actin g as a catalyst for
discussion alon g particular lin es or by proddin g oth er
in stitutions into deliberative action .
As a result of th ese dyn am ics, Friedm an describes th e
fun ction of judicial review in th e Un ited States con stitution al
system as on e of prom otin g an d facilitating con stitution al
Th e Court’s participation in th is dialogue is
dialogue.190
dyn am ic—not on ly does it spark a process of n ation al
discussion , but it is also, in turn , affected an d sh aped by th is
con versation .191 Wh en a decision is rendered it is subject to
discussion an d debate w ith in society. Over tim e, if th ere is
en ough popular disagreem en t w ith th e Court’s rulin g, n ew
legislation m ay be passed an d legal ch allen ges brough t th at
test the fin ality of th e decision in a m ore con crete sense. As a
result of th is dissen t an d debate, th e Court m ay ultim ately
com e to reconsider an d refash ion its decision . Under th is
m odel, th e perspectives of non -judicial actors m ay therefore
in fluen ce th e Court as m uch , if n ot m ore, th an th e Court itself
in fluen ces th e rest of society.192 Over tim e, th is process
produces a relatively en durin g constitution al equilibrium th at
is w idely accepted by all th e participan ts in th e n ation al
discussion . Friedm an furth er argues th at the dialogic role th e
judiciary perform s is a valuable on e, as it “ach ieves th e
separation of con stitution al requirem ents from im m ediate
political preferen ces,”193 an d, in th e lon g term , the production of
190

Friedm an, The Im portance of Being Positive, supra note 148, at 1295-9$
(“Prom ptin g, m ain tain in g, an d focusin g th is debate about constitution al m ean in g is the
prim ary function of judicial review .”); Friedm an , Politics ofJudicialR eview , supra n ote
185, at 334 (“[J]udicial review serves to ch ann el an d foster societal debate about
con stitution al m ean in g.”).
191
See Friedm an , D ialogue, supra n ote 27, at $79 (Th is “dyn am ic ten sion [is
w h at] m oves the system of con stitution al in terpretation alon g.”).
192
Th is judicial function is thus differen t th an an educative role, as th e Court
is n ot th e on ly actor in fluen cin g con stitution al m ean in g. Cf. Bickel’s th eory, supra Part
III.B.2.i.
193
Friedm an, The Im portance of Being Positive, supra note 148, at 1291.
Friedm an describes th is as an im portan t aspect of con stitution alism , as the distin ction
betw een th e Con stitution an d ordin ary law m ean s, at the very least, th at the
Con stitution cann ot m ean w h atever th e m ajority h appen s to th ink it m ean s at a
particular poin t in tim e. Id. at 1297-98; see also Friedm an , M ediated Popular
Constitutionalism , supra note 187, at 2$02; Barry Friedm an & Scott B. Sm ith, The
Sedim entary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1998) (“The role of con stitution al
in terpreter is to recon cile our deepest constitution al com m itm en ts, revealed by all of
our con stitution al h istory, w ith today’s preferences.”).
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stable and broadly supported an sw ers to questions of
con stitution al m ean in g.194
Th is un derstan din g of h ow th e institution al dyn am ics of
th e con stitution al order lead, in th e fulln ess of tim e, to a stable
equilibrium about con stitution al m ean in g echoes th e m odel of
“law as equilibrium ” that William Eskridge and Ph ilip Frickey
h ave proposed.195 Draw in g on positive political th eories of
in stitution al in teraction , Eskridge an d Frickey argue th at th e
differen t bran ch es of govern m en t seek “to prom ote [th eir ow n]
vision of th e public interest.”19$ As a result of th e political
con strain ts on each bran ch , th at vision can on ly be ach ieved
w ith in a com plex in terdepen den t system in w h ich each bran ch
of governm en t com petes an d bargains strategically w ith the
oth ers about th eir differen t view s of con stitution al m eanin g.197
An un derstan din g of dialogue based on th ese in stitution al
in teraction s m igh t lead on e to th ink th at th is is an oth er
com petitive th eory of con stitution al dialogue. How ever, the
focus h ere is less on how different institution al actors en gage in
a tussle to prom ote th eir ow n view s about con stitution al
m ean in g, and m ore about h ow judicial and n on -judicial actors
com e to learn, debate, an d adapt or m odify their view s due to
th eir in terdependen t participation in con stitution al dialogue.198
Relyin g h eavily on positive eviden ce about th e w ays in
w h ich political an d social actors respon d to th e Court,
Friedm an’s accoun t suggests th at con cern s about th e
coun term ajoritarian difficulty in th e Un ited States are often
overstated.199 Th is con clusion is ch allen ged, h ow ever, by Post
an d Siegel as part of th eir sligh tly different description of
con stitution al dialogue as equilibrium . Utilizin g a different
m eth odology, th ey suggest th at con cern s rem ain about th e
possibility of judicial overreach in g even un der an equilibrium
th eory of dialogue.

194
Friedm an, M ediated Popular Constitutionalism , supra note 187, at 2$02
(“[T]h e judiciary plays an im portan t role in iden tifyin g those con stitution al values th at
ach ieve w idespread support over tim e. Th is is not an exclusively judicial role, but
given the function s perform ed by th e differen t branches th is task falls largely on the
judiciary.”).
195
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Ph ilip P. Frickey, Law as E quilibrium , 108
HARV. L. REV. 2$, 32 (1994).
19$
Id. at 28.
197
Id. at 28-29.
198
See Friedm an , D ialogue, supra note 27, at $54 (“The process of reach in g an
in terpretative con sen sus on th e [con stitution al] text is dyn am ic.”).
199
Friedm an, The Im portance ofBeing Positive, supra n ote 148, at 1272-82.
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As a m atter of description an d as a structural feature of
th e Un ited States con stitution al system , Post an d Siegel agree
w ith Friedm an th at th e Suprem e Court is n ecessarily en gaged
in a dialogue w ith th e “con stitution al culture” of th e n ation
Th eir un derstandin g is,
about con stitution al m ean in g.200
h ow ever, based principally on h istorical an d cultural
exam ples,201 rath er th an th e kin ds of positive social science
eviden ce on w h ich Friedm an relies.202 Th ese rich h istorical
exam ples sh ow th at, w h ile th e Court plays an active role in
in spirin g or facilitatin g popular understan din gs of th e
Con stitution , ch an gin g con stitution al understan din gs of th e
people can also en able th e Court “to learn . . . about a better
w ay to in terpret th e Con stitution .”203 Con stitution al law
pron oun ced by th e Court th erefore does n ot develop in isolation
from , n or w ith out in corporatin g, th e values and beliefs of n onjudicial actors in society. As a result, the Court’s decisions w ill
on ly acquire on goin g legitim acy if th e n ation com es to accept
th em over th e lon g term an d som e period of “relatively secure
equilibrium ” results.204 Sim ilar to Friedm an , th ey claim th at
th is system of constitution al dialogue is n orm atively desirable,
due to th e fact th at over th e lon ger term it produces an sw ers
w h ich broadly conform to th e constitution al understan din gs of
th e people.
Post’s an d Siegel’s relian ce on h istorical description
rath er th an positive social scien ce evidence has con sequen ces
in relation to w h at th ey see as lin gerin g dem ocratic legitim acy
con cerns associated w ith judicial review . Wh ile th ey argue, on
200
Th is h as been described in greatest detail in Robert Post’s 2002 Suprem e
Court forew ord. See Post, Xashioning the LegalConstitution, supra n ote 184, at 11; see
also Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism , supra n ote 184, at 1983. In usin g th e
term “con stitution al law ,” Post is referring to “con stitution al law as it is m ade from th e
perspective of th e judiciary.” Post, Xashioning the Legal Constitution, supra note 184,
at 8. “Con stitution al culture,” in con trast, refers m ore specifically to th e beliefs an d
values of non -judicial actors about the m ean in g of the Con stitution . Id.
201
See, e.g., Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism , supra note 184, at
1950 (“History dem on strates that con stitution al law is in con tin ual dialogue w ith th e
con stitution al culture of the nation .”). See also generally Reva B. Siegel, Text in
Contest:G ender and the Constitution from a SocialM ovem ent Perspective, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 297 (2001) (describin g stories of the Equal Righ ts Am en dm en t an d th e
Nineteen th Am en dm en t as exam ples of th e role of a m obilized citizenry in the m akin g
of Am erican con stitution al law ).
202
Social science evidence h as, h ow ever, in fluenced their w ork. See, e.g., Post,
Xashioning the Legal Constitution, supra note 184, at 35-3$ (discussin g th e in sigh ts of
political scien tists an d h istorian s w ho study the Suprem e Court).
203
Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism , supra note 184, at 2059.
204
Post, Xashioning the Legal Constitution, supra note 184, at 107-08. Post
th us describes legal authority as developin g “diach ron ically” across tim e. Id.
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th e on e h an d, th at con stitution al dialogue is in stitution ally
“in escapable,”205 th ey n on eth eless attribute a great deal of
pow er to th e Court to con trol th e am ount an d extent of
dialogue th at takes place in relation to certain issues of vital
im portan ce to th e n ation . For in stan ce, in th eir scholarsh ip
con cern in g section 5 of th e Fourteen th Am endm en t, Post and
Siegel describe a Court th at h as stifled con stitution al dialogue
by preven tin g Con gress from actin g on its ow n in terpretation of
con stitution al righ ts.20$ More generally, Post has described the
Court as con structin g a “m em bran e” th at separates its view s
about con stitution al m ean in g from th ose of oth er actors.207
Wh ile th e Court gen erally allow s th is m em bran e to rem ain
h igh ly porous so as to facilitate con stitutional dialogue, th e
Court can stiffen th e m em brane if it form s th e view th at
popular attitudes th reaten sign ificant con stitution al values.208
Due to th is potential for judicial overreach in g, Post an d
Siegel argue th at th e Court sh ould exercise a degree of selfrestrain t w h en perform in g its judicial review fun ction s.209 If it
does n ot, they fear th at “th e tech n ical legal reason of
con stitution al law w ill . . . suffocate th e political dim ensions of
th e Con stitution.”210 A differen t w ay of un derstan din g th is is
th at legal pronoun cem en ts of judicial suprem acy m ay foster
social an d political beliefs th at th e judiciary is th e ultim ate
in terpreter of th e Constitution. Over th e lon g term , th is m ay
m ean th at th e political bran ch es of govern m ent an d th e people
ch an ge h ow th ey react to judicial decisions an d refrain from
ch allen gin g th e Court, th ereby dow n gradin g th eir roles in th e
con stitution al dialogue an d exacerbatin g dem ocratic legitim acy
con cerns.211
205

Id. at 9.
See generally Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism , supra n ote 184;
Post & Siegel, Protecting the Constitution, supra note 184.
207
Post, Xashioning the Legal Constitution, supra note 184, at 9-10, 41
(describing the “m em brane” betw een con stitution al law an d con stitution al culture).
208
Id. at 41, 49-50.
209
Id. at 37 (“The depen dence of con stitution al law on th is con tinuin g
dialogue coun sels restrain t in th e exercise of judicial review . Th is is because the
legitim acy of judicially fash ion ed con stitution al law is un derstood to depen d upon its
groun din g in con stitution al culture.” (citation om itted)).
210
Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism , supra n ote 3, at 1041.
211
Post an d Siegel claim th at th is has occurred in relation to Con gress’ pow er
un der section 5 of th e Fourteen th Am en dm en t, arguin g th at Con gress h as recen tly
seem ed “disen gaged an d possibly con fused” about the situation s an d circum stan ces in
w h ich it can an d sh ould exercise th is pow er, due to a series of aggressive rulin gs by th e
Court. Post & Siegel, Protecting the Constitution, supra note 184, at 43 (citin g Neal
Devin s, Congress as Culprit: H ow Law m akers Spurred on the Court’s A nti-Congress
20$
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Alth ough Post an d Siegel are righ t to w orry about th e
issue of judicial overreach in g, their con cern th at th is is likely to
occur in relation to issues of vital im portan ce to th e n ation is
m isplaced. In such high salien cy cases, the social science
literature th at Friedm an relies on reveals that alth ough th e
Court m ay perceive itself as the ultim ate interpreter of th e
Con stitution , th is does n ot m ean th at th e Court can actively
con trol h ow non -judicial actors im plem en t or respon d to its
decision s.212 Rath er, on a strictly positive accoun t, th ese cases
are likely to prom pt n ation al dialogue about con stitution al
m ean in g, w h ich w ill serve to brin g the Court in to lin e over th e
lon ger term .
If Post an d Siegel directed th eir atten tion to low
salien cy cases, h ow ever, th e story about judicial overreach in g
is likely to be different. Th e Court m ay be in a better position
to cem en t its ow n view s on issues of relatively low political
salien ce th at are un likely to en gage popular discussion in an y
m ean in gful w ay. In such cases, th e tim e that is n eeded for
oth er actors to respond to th e Court m ay bolster m ore assertive
judicial action. Th is h igh ligh ts the difficulty w ith Friedm an ’s
accoun t, w h ich is th at h e does n ot take full accoun t of th e
poten tial for judicial overreach in g in cases th at do n ot en gage
w idespread con stitutional discussion.213 If th e long term effects
of judicial action in th ese cases are such th at n on -judicial
actors in creasin gly refrain from ch allen gin g the Court, th en it
m ay be true th at th is accoun t of dialogic judicial review suffers
from lin gerin g dem ocratic debilitation effects.
Wh ile equilibrium th eory does n ot com pletely resolve
con cerns about th e coun term ajoritarian difficulty, it is m ore
successful th an an y of th e th eories previously exam in ed in th is
Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435 (2001)). In relation to th ese con cern s, see also KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra n ote 2, at 233; TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 2, at 194.
212
Friedm an suggests, for exam ple, th at th ere is good reason to th ink th at th e
Suprem e Court’s “federalism revolution ,” w h ich h as been critiqued by Post an d Siegel
as an exam ple of judicial overreach in g, is “perfectly con sisten t w ith popular opin ion.”
Friedm an, The Im portance ofBeing Positive, supra note 148, at 1299. Friedm an is also
of th e view th at recen t judicial decision s tem per con cern s th at th e judiciary is usurpin g
pow er w ith in th e con stitution al system . Id. at 1298-1302.
213
Friedm an does allude to th is w h en he states, “Som e judicial decisions do
strike a n ation al nerve, an d w h en they do, they rouse opposition .” Friedm an , The
Im portance of Being Positive, supra n ote 148, at 1297 (em phasis added); see also
Friedm an, D ialogue, supra n ote 27, at $04 n .135 (“[A]ll bran ch es of governm en t likely
w ill be coun term ajoritarian in som e in stan ces. In deed, th e Court m igh t con fin e its
coun term ajoritarian activity to certain special cases, legitim atin g th ese w ith oth erw ise
frequen t reference to m ajority w ill.”).
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article in positin g a substan tive dialogic role for th e judiciary
th at justifies its in volvem en t in judicial review . Critical to th e
n orm ative appeal of these th eories is the society-w ide n ature of
dialogue, w hich is rath er differen t th an th e strictly
in stitution al accoun ts th at are foun d in m ost oth er th eories.214
Th e role of ch an n elin g an d fosterin g societal discussion
recogn izes th at th e Court is n ot sim ply an addition al voice in
con stitution al dialogue, but actively en gages in a gen erative
exch an ge th at ultim ately leads to a settled equilibrium about
con stitution al m ean in g. Th is is n orm atively desirable because
th e judicial m oderation an d facilitation of th e con tribution s of
differen t dialogic participan ts assists in th e search for m ore
w idely accepted and en durin g an sw ers to question s of
con stitution al m ean in g.
As a m atter of description , w e m igh t, h ow ever, question
w h eth er th e level of engagem en t of the people in con stitution al
dialogue in th e Un ited States is as exten sive as th is accoun t
suggests. For exam ple, th ere is a large body of em pirical
eviden ce th at reveals w idespread political apath y am on gst
citizens in con tem porary Am erican society.215 In recent years,
citizen in terest in politics h as declin ed, together w ith levels of
popular participation . Popular in put in m an y circum stan ces,
w h eth er th rough election s or social m ovem en ts, also appears to
be lim ited to discrete groups of w ell-educated an d w ealth y
in dividuals.21$
Non eth eless, th e com plete picture rem ains
un clear because social scien ce data in creasin gly suggests th at
judicial outcom es ten d to fall into lin e w ith public opin ion over
th e lon ger term , w ith constitution al m ean in g also sh iftin g
accordin gly.217 Such eviden ce does support th e recogn ition of
th e people as participan ts in constitution al dialogue, even if w e
do n ot un derstand precisely th e w ays in w h ich th ey in fluen ce
214
See Friedm an, D ialogue, supra n ote 27, at $58 n .410 (“I differ w ith – or
m ove a step past – Fisher in that I believe th at all branches facilitate a dialogue in
w h ich the people give con ten t to the con stitution al text.”). Devin s an d Fisher do
con tem plate a greater role for th e people in their recen t w ork. See DEVINS & FISHER,
supra note 29, at $; Devin s & Fish er, JudicialE xclusivity, supra n ote 95, at 94-98, 104.
Non eth eless, th ey still preserve th e m ost im portan t roles in constitution al dialogue to
th e th ree bran ches of governm en t, due to the basis of th eir th eory in coordin ate
con struction an d in stitution al checks an d balan ces.
215
See Don i Gew irtzm an, G lory D ays: Popular Constitutionalism , N ostalgia,
and the True N ature ofConstitutionalCulture, 93 GEO. L.J. 897, 913 (2005) (exam in in g
em pirical research w h ich suggests th at “the People h ave little in terest in increased
civic respon sibility or greater popular accoun tability in politics”).
21$
Id. at 931 & n.251 (citing em pirical studies w h ich suggest th at “[w ]ealth
an d education are th e stron gest predictors of political participation ”).
217
See supra note 202 an d accom pan yin g text.
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con stitution al debate. Given th e eviden ce of grow in g civic
disen gagem en t, h ow ever, w e sh ould also th ink about practical
strategies th at w ould en able th e view s of the citizen ry to be
in corporated m ore com pletely in to con stitution al dialogue in
th e future.
Even if som e aspects of th e people’s positive role in th e
Am erican system fail to be com pletely un derstood, th e
n orm ative desirability of con n ectin g debate an d discussion
about constitution al values to broader society is clear. Th is is
closely
linked
to
a
particular
un derstan din g
of
con stitution alism th at view s th e Con stitution n ot on ly as a
docum ent of positive law th at creates governm en t institutions
an d defin es rules of govern m en tal beh avior, but also as an
“expression of th e deepest beliefs an d con victions of
th e . . . n ation , of our ‘fun dam en tal prin ciples as th ey h ave been
un derstood by the tradition s of our people and our law .’”218 On e
of th e fun ction s of a Con stitution is to constitute th e ch aracter
an d sen sibilities of a n ation , allow in g for th e possibility of selfrevision an d transform ation over tim e as th e n ation ’s selfun derstan din g grow s an d ch an ges.219 As Han n a Pitkin h as
said, “[I]n th is sen se, our constitution is less som eth in g w e
have th an som eth in g w e are . . . . Th is sense of ‘con stitution ,’
th en , is activatin g an d em pow erin g, callin g us to our pow ers as
co-foun ders and to our responsibilities.”220
An an alogy can be draw n betw een th is understan din g of
con stitution alism an d argum en ts m ade in various n ations
regardin g th e effect of en tren ch in g h um an rights guarantees in
n ation al law . Com m en tators h ave suggested th at on e of th e
m ost im portant effects of th e en tren chm en t of fun dam en tal
218
Com pare Post, Xashioning the Legal Constitution, supra note 184, at 3$
(quotin g Loch n er v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 7$ (1905) (Holm es, J., dissen tin g)), w ith
SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 4$-50 (1988), and San ford Levin son,
Constitutional Protestantism in Theory and Practice:Tw o Q uestions for M ichael Stokes
Paulsen and O ne for H is Critics, 83 GEO. L.J. 373, 37$ (1994) (Levin son offers a
con trastin g view regardin g th e necessity of active, in depen den t con stitution al
in terpretation by citizen s.).
219
Mark Tushn et refers to th is as expressivism . Mark Tush n et, The
Possibilities of Com parative Constitutional Law , 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 12$9-85 (1999);
see also Mark Tush net, Xidelity as Synthesis:Constituting W e the People, $5 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1557, 1558 (1997) (“A people can be con stituted in m any w ays. But an y one
people is h istorically con stituted in on ly one w ay. An d h ere is w h ere con stitution al law
com es in.”).
220
Han n a Fen ichel Pitkin , The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1$7,
1$7-$8 (1987); see also Roger Cotterrell, The Sym bolism of Constitutions:Som e A ngloA m erican Com parisons, in A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP*: AMERICAN INFLUENCES ON
PUBLIC LAW IN THE UK 25 (Ian Lovelan d ed., 1995).
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righ ts is to create a h um an righ ts culture th at provides a value
system by w h ich a society lives an d con ducts itself.221 In order
to ach ieve th is deep culture of respect for righ ts, h um an righ ts
values m ust be effectively in tern alized by all m em bers of a
society.222 Th e best w ay to ach ieve th is an d to foster the
legitim acy of con stitution al com m itm ents to righ ts as
im portan t expressions of a n ation ’s self-understan din g m ay
w ell be adaptin g or design in g system s of constitution al
dialogue in a w ay that recogn izes th e central place of th e
people in on goin g discussion about fundam ental values.223 Th is
is also likely to foster greater confiden ce am on g m em bers of th e
populace th at th ey can h ave a legitim ate voice in th e debate
about con stitutional m ean in g an d ch an ge w ith in th eir society.
Wh ile th is accoun t h as great n orm ative appeal as a w ay
of un derstandin g con stitution al dialogue, it ultim ately fails to
provide a com plete accoun t of th e role of judicial review in
dem ocratic constitutionalism . In th is regard, w e first n eed to
ask w h eth er sim ilar dialogic dyn am ics are likely to be
observable or ach ievable in constitution al system s outside th e
Un ited States. If th ey are n ot, then th is accoun t is un likely to
provide a n orm atively satisfyin g vision of con stitution alism

221
See FRANCESCA KLUG, VALUES FOR A GODLESS AGE: THE STORY OF THE
UK’S NEW BILL OF RIGHTS 213 (2000) (“It is n ot possible in a dem ocracy to attem pt to
create a h um an righ ts culture w ith out in volvin g the people in its form ation . An d it is
sim ply not sustain able to pin so m uch on th e idea of h um an righ ts . . . w ithout
w idespread participation in developin g its m ean in g an d scope.”).
222
As one com m en tator h as stated, “[h ]istory an d experien ce suggest th at, to
be effective, a bill of righ ts m ust be em bedded in a culture of dem ocratic
con stitution alism ” an d a m ore effective n ation al sch em e of righ ts protection m ay be
ach ievable w h en it in volves th e com m un ity th at the bill of righ ts is designed to serve.
George William s, Constructing a Com m unity-Based Bill of R ights, in PROTECTING
HUMAN RIGHTS: INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS, supra n ote 53, at 247, 249. Cf.
Ch eryl Saun ders, Protecting R ights in Com m on Law Constitutional System s: A
Xram ew ork for a Com parative Study, 53 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 83, 95
(2002) (“Th e righ ts in strum en ts an d th e debate associated w ith th eir operation in
practice . . . h ave a poten tial educative effect for th e com m un ity as a w hole, an d th us,
m ay con tribute to the developm en t of civil society.”).
223
Th is un derstan din g of th e position of the people w ith in the con stitution al
system can be con trasted w ith th at proposed by Bruce Ackerm an. See 1 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 10 (1991). Ackerm an argues th at
con stitution al m ean in g is determ ined by the people in rare m om en ts of “h igh er
law m aking,” an d th at th e role of th e judiciary is to “protect[] th e h ard-w on principles of
a m obilized citizen ry again st erosion by political elites w ho h ave failed to gain broad
an d deep popular support for th eir in novation s.” Id. at 10. Th e un derstan din g of
dialogue discussed here proposes a m ore direct role for the people in determ in in g
con stitution al m ean ing, not on ly at tim es of “h igher law m akin g,” but also durin g
periods of “n orm al law m akin g.” See id. at 299-301 (distin guish in g betw een “h igh er
law m aking” an d “norm al law m akin g”).
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th at h as gen eral appeal, even if it succeeds in providin g th is in
relation to th e Un ited States system .
In th is regard, Mark Tush n et h as suggested th at th is
form of lon g-term dialogue is a un ique feature of th e Am erican
system . Accordin g to Tush n et, th is is because th e process of
dialogue in th e Un ited States is n ecessarily m ore in form al an d
exten ded in tim e th an in countries, such as Can ada, w h ere
direct in stitution al m ech an ism s exist for the political bran ch es
to ch allen ge judicial decisions.224 Con versely, h e argues th at a
differen t kin d of sh ort-term dialogue is m ore likely in Can ada,
due to th e ability of th e political bran ches to m ore rapidly
override or revise judicial decisions.225
Wh ile th e specific course of in stitution al in teraction s in
th e Un ited States an d Can ada is certain ly likely to be affected
by differen ces in th e structural m ech an ism s that exist in th ose
coun tries, th is does not m ean th at broader dialogue about
con stitution al values in volvin g th e people does n ot, or could
n ot, occur w ith in th e Can adian con stitutional system . As a
result, even if a form of sh orter term in stitution al dialogue
takes place in specific cases due to the structural features of
th e Can adian Ch arter, lon ger term society-w ide dialogue m ay
still take place betw een th e Court, th e political bran ch es, and
th e people regardin g th e m ean in g of the broad con stitution al
values th at arise in those cases. In deed, rath er th an view in g
th ese in teractions as differen t form s of dialogue, th e better
view is th at th ey are differen t aspects of th e sam e dialogue, as
th e specific institutional in teractions th at take place in th e
con text of in dividual cases can, in due course, form part of a
broader societal dialogue about constitution al m ean in g.
Ultim ately, th e exten t to w h ich dialogue takes place in th is
form in Can ada, or in oth er coun tries, w ill depend on th e
positive dyn am ics of those con stitution al system s.22$ How ever,

224
See, e.g., Tush n et, Constitutional Patriotism , supra n ote 57 (distin guish ing
betw een dialogue in w eak an d strong form system s of judicial review , in part, on the
basis of the tim e over w h ich the dialogue is likely to take place).
225
Tush net rem ain s skeptical, h ow ever, regarding w hether even sh ort-term
dialogue really exists as a m atter of description in Can ada, given the apparen t
delegitim ization of the override. See, e.g., Tush n et, A lternative Xorm s of Judicial
R eview , supra note 71; Mark Tush net, Marbury v. Madison A round the W orld, 71
TENN. L. REV. 251, 2$4-74 (2004).
22$
Whether dialogue presen tly takes place in th is form in Can ada is presen tly
un certain, given the relative dearth of political scien ce literature on such issues. One
recen t exception w h ich takes a broader positive an alysis of dialogue in Can ada focuses
on the n ature of dialogue in Can ada betw een the federal govern m en t an d the low er
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given th at th ere is n othin g in prin ciple th at suggests th at these
dyn am ics can n ot exist in oth er n ation s, th is accoun t of dialogue
does h ave th e poten tial to provide a n orm atively satisfyin g
vision of con stitution alism outside, as w ell as in side, th e
Un ited States.
Th is discussion n on etheless poin ts to a differen t reason
w h y th e equilibrium
m odel rem ains an in com plete
un derstan din g of the role of judicial review in m odern
con stitution alism .
Paradoxically, th is also relates to th e
m odel’s focus on form s of dialogue th at en gage society as a
w h ole. Alth ough it h as been argued th at broaden in g th e focus
to society-w ide dialogue is a sign ifican t th eoretical
con tribution , th e sin gular n ature of th is focus un derplays th e
in stitution al aspects of con stitution al dialogue. Furth erm ore,
th ere is a vital need for a supplem ental accoun t of h ow
con stitution al dialogue does, or can, proceed at th e institution al
level betw een th e judiciary an d th e political bran ch es of
govern m en t, given th at society-w ide dialogue is un likely to
take place in relation to a ran ge of con stitution al issues of
relatively low political salien ce.227 Fortun ately, th ere rem ains
on e accoun t of con stitution al dialogue th at can assist us in th is
regard.
4.

Partn ersh ip Th eories

Th e partnership m odel of dialogue cen ters on the
recogn ition th at th e differently situated bran ch es of
govern m en t can m ake distin ct contribution s to con stitution al
dialogue in a w ay th at does n ot privilege th e judicial role. Th is
accoun t recogn izes th at each branch of governm en t learn s from
th e specific dialogic in puts of th e oth er bran ch es in an
courts. See Matthew A. Hen n igar, E xpanding the ‘D ialogue’D ebate:Canadian Xederal
G overnm ent R esponses to Low er Court Charter D ecisions, 37 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 3 (2004).
227
Friedm an suggests th at the Court ren ders decision s in “explicitly
con stitution al term s,” but th is does n ot, in itself, articulate an y m ore distin ctive
in stitution al com petences th at th e Court brin gs to its dialogic role. See Friedm an, The
Im portance of Being Positive, supra n ote 148, at 1291. In con trast, Post an d Siegel do
recogn ize “in stitution ally differen tiated w ays” in w h ich the judiciary an d th e political
bran ches en gage in con stitution al discussion .
Post & Siegel, Legislative
Constitutionalism , supra n ote 184, at 198$. For exam ple, they con sider th at courts
h ave the in stitution ally specific role of defin in g an d en forcin g righ ts in particular cases
in th e procedural con text of adjudication, w hereas Con gress derives its specific
in stitution al com petences from its dem ocratic respon siveness. See, e.g., id. at 19$$-$7,
1970. Their explan ation of dialogue, h ow ever, cen ters to a greater exten t on broader
dialogue w ith the con stitution al culture of a n ation, rather th an on these in stitution al
aspects.
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in stitution ally diverse con stitution al order.228 Judicial an d nonjudicial actors are thus conceived as equal participants in
con stitution al decision-m akin g, both of w hom dialogically
con tribute to the search for better an sw ers as a result of th eir
un ique in stitution al perspectives.229
Th e m ost prom in en t accoun t of con stitution al dialogue
as partn ersh ip in th is in stitution al vein h as been proposed by
Jan et Hiebert in th e con text of th e Can adian Ch arter, though
h er view s about institution al in teraction s can be applied m ore
gen erally to th e Un ited States an d oth er n ation s.230 Hiebert
begin s w ith th e claim th at both courts and legislatures sh are
respon sibility for m akin g judgm en ts about con stitution al
values an d for assessin g th e reason ableness of th eir ow n
actions in ligh t of th ose values.231 Th is focus on legislative, as
w ell as judicial, respon sibility is im portan t because it
recogn izes th at n ot all legislation w ill be subject to ch allen ge
before th e courts. If legislatures did n ot en gage in th eir ow n
228
Cf. Keith E. Wh ittington , In D efense of Legislatures, 28 POL. THEORY $90,
$97 (2000) (“[I]n stitution s . . . develop distin ct m ission s, cultures, m odes of beh avior,
n orm s, an d such , w h ich affect both th e beh avior of in dividuals w ith in those in stitution s
an d th eir collective output.”).
229
Wh ile a n um ber of theorists of con stitution al dialogue describe th eir
th eories as “partnersh ip” theories, it is question able w h eth er these are truly
partn ersh ip theories in the term s in w h ich th at expression is used in th is Article. Tsvi
Kah an a, for exam ple, h as developed a self-described partnersh ip approach as part of
h is goal of providin g a theoretical justification for the existen ce an d use of the override
provision in the Can adian Ch arter.
See Tsvi Kah an a, U nderstanding the
N otw ithstanding M echanism , 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 221, 255-5$ (2002). Kah an a
conceives of th e Court’s role as on e of deliberation an d of prom otin g discussion an d
debate about con stitution al m ean in g, but also posits an additional un ique con tribution
th at judges can m ake to con stitution al dialogue, due to the fact th at courts h ave the
specialized capacity to “interpret[] texts, specify[] ideas, an d offer[] legal reason ing,”
w h ereas legislatures do not. Id. at 250. As a result of these special legal skills, the
legislature can read decision s of th e Court an d learn from judicial deliberation s,
allow in g it to subsequen tly conduct its ow n deliberation in those term s. How ever,
Kah an a does n ot con sider w hether th e legislature h as a differen t an d equally
im portan t perspective to offer in th e dialogue about con stitution al m ean ing, as he
ultim ately con siders th at w h ile legislatures an d courts are equally m otivated to
in terpret th e Con stitution , courts are m ore com petent to en gage in con stitution al
in terpretation th an legislatures. Id. As a result, Kah an a’s attem pts to justify an
addition al, in stitution ally specific role for the judiciary and th e legislature in
con stitution al dialogue th us contin ue to privilege th e ability of judges to in terpret th e
Con stitution, leadin g to another rath er judicial-cen tric an d un equal accoun t of
con stitution al dialogue w h ich it is difficult to call a “partnersh ip” m odel.
230
HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS, supra n ote $9, at 50-72; see also Hiebert,
Parliam ent and R ights, supra n ote 53; Janet L. Hiebert, N ew ConstitutionalIdeas:Can
N ew Parliam entary M odels R esist Judicial D om inance W hen Interpreting R ights?, 82
TEX . L. REV. 19$3 (2004) [h erein after Hiebert, N ew Constitutional Ideas] (discussin g
both th e Can adian Ch arter an d th e Un ited Kin gdom Hum an Rights Act).
231
See, e.g., HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS, supra note $9, at 52 (“[E]ach body
[m ust] satisfy itself th at its judgm en t respects Ch arter values.”).
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in dependen t in terpretation of con stitution al values, th en th e
overridin g goal of constitution alism , n am ely “en surin g th at
state actions are con sisten t w ith its n orm ative values,” m ay n ot
be com pletely realized.232 Wh ile courts an d legislatures sh are
respon sibility for respectin g con stitution al values, each h as a
“distin ct relation ship” to a con stitution al con flict.233 Th is is n ot
on ly because th ey are differen tly situated, but also because
th ey each brin g distin ct an d valuable perspectives to
con stitution al judgm en t given th eir differen t in stitution al
ch aracteristics and respon sibilities.234
Hiebert describes a n um ber of distin ct perspectives and
abilities th at judges an d legislatures brin g to con stitution al
judgm en ts. In relation to the judiciary, sh e rejects th e view
th at courts are better able to resolve disagreem en ts about th e
Sh e does
m ean in g of righ ts in a prin cipled m an n er.235
n everth eless con sider th at th e relative in sulation of judges
from political an d social pressures gives th em a greater degree
of freedom to iden tify circum stan ces in w h ich legislative goals
un duly restrict righ ts or h ave un in tention al con sequen ces th at
un n ecessarily restrict righ ts.23$ In addition , in terpretin g and
defin in g righ ts is at th e core of judicial decision-m akin g
because it is a task th at judges regularly an d deliberately
perform .237
Hiebert also argues th at th ere are distin ct
disadvantages w ith the judicial role, w h ich m ean s th at judges
can actively learn from th e legislature’s differen t perspective.
232

Id. at 220.
Id. at 51.
234
See, e.g., Hiebert, Parliam ent and R ights, supra note 53, at 239 (“Th e tw o
in stitution s sh are respon sibility for evaluatin g the m erits of legislative ch oices an d
brin g to their respective judgm en ts differen t perspectives th at reflect th eir distin ctive
roles an d the fact th at they are situated differen tly, relative to the Ch arter con flict.”).
235
See, e.g., HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS, supra n ote $9, at 54 (“Th e
proposition th at on ly judges are capable of m akin g conscious and prin cipled decision s
w h ere righ ts are affected un derestim ates th e exten t to w h ich Ch arter evaluation h as
becom e an intrin sic part of the policy process.”).
23$
Id. at xii.
237
Id. at 53. Hiebert does, how ever, argue th at th e Court h as a particular
respon sibility in its dialogic in teractions w ith th e legislature in relation to w h at sh e
term s “core righ ts” un der th e Ch arter, w h ich she describes as th e “broad ran ge of
requirem en ts necessary for the people to govern th em selves in a representative
system .” Id. at 57. Wh ile sh e does n ot claim th at the judiciary h as special abilities in
relation to in terpretin g th ese righ ts, she does con sider th at courts h ave a special
respon sibility to ensure th at Parliam en t h as taken such rights seriously. Id. at $9-70.
Th is part of Hiebert’s an alysis can be criticized, as it appears to assum e th at courts
in deed perform a m ore prin cipled role in relation to such issues. The theory rem ain s
coheren t as a theory of con stitution al dialogue, how ever, w ithout th is added elem en t.
233
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In th is regard, th e legislative bran ch h as an advan tage in
addressin g th e question of w h en th e pursuit of policy objectives
m igh t n ecessitate th e restriction of righ ts, given its access to
resources an d th e policy expertise th at exists w ith in th e
political bran ch es of govern m en t. In con trast to judicial
decision s, policy decision s are based upon “specialized
expertise, relevan t in form ation and data, previous trials an d
failures, com parative experience, and in form ed best
estim ates.”238 Accordingly, alth ough th e legislature m ight
ben efit from
a w ell-reason ed judicial decision w h en
determ in in g w h eth er its objectives are sufficien tly im portant to
justify an y lim itation of righ ts, th is judicial input sh ould not be
privileged an d sh ould “n ot replace political judgm en t.”239
As a result of th ese distin ct perspectives an d th eir
“separate yet in terconn ected” positions in th e con stitution al
order, th e judiciary an d th e legislature are able to en gage in a
dialogue about constitution al m ean in g, in w h ich both sh ould
exercise m odesty about th eir ow n con clusions an d listen to and
learn from each oth er’s perspectives, m odifyin g th eir ow n view s
accordin gly.240 In th e Can adian context, th is poten tial for
in stitution al dialogue can be realized in a n um ber of differen t
w ays. First, Hiebert suggests th at dialogue begin s w ith
legislators in m ost circum stances w h en th ey in itially con sider
w h eth er legislation is con sisten t w ith th e Ch arter. It th en
con tin ues in th e context of in dividual cases, w h ere th e
deliberation s of th e legislature are con veyed th rough legal
argum en t an d w h ere the deliberations of the court are revealed
th rough its judgm ents, w ith both parties learn in g from each

238

Hiebert, Parliam ent and R ights, supra note 53, at 240.
Id. at 239. Hiebert also con siders th at an y form of in teraction in w h ich the
judicial voice is privileged is n ot h ealth y for the in stitution of dem ocratic govern m en t,
as th is w ould dim in ish “political respon sibility to pursue im portan t policy goals an d
m ay lead to the unn ecessary use of n on -am bitious or in effective m ean s to pursue these
objectives.” HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS, supra note $9, at xiii.
240
HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS, supra note $9, at 51. Hiebert previously
referred to the m etaph ors of dialogue an d con versation to describe her preferred form s
of in teraction betw een courts and legislatures in the Can adian con text. See JANET L.
HIEBERT, LIMITING RIGHTS: THE DILEMMA OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 124-25, 154-55 (199$);
Jan et L. Hiebert, W hy M ust a Bill of R ights be a Contest of Political W ills? The
Canadian A lternative, 10 PUB. L. REV. 22 (1999); HIEBERT, ENRICHING
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE, supra n ote 155, at 1. Sh e h as now revised her view s
sligh tly an d refers to her theory as a “relation al approach .” HIEBERT, CHARTER
CONFLICTS, supra n ote $9, at 50-51. Wh ile her term inology h as ch an ged, the theory
can still be regarded as a “dialogue” theory, as th e general thrust of h er view s about
th e in stitution al in teraction s th at sh ould take place betw een th e judiciary an d
legislatures in Can ada rem ain the sam e.
239
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oth ers’ view s.241 Th e dialogue th en returns to th e legislature,
w h ich con siders if and h ow to respon d to th e court’s decision.
Th is approach also leaves space for th e legislature to m ake use
of th e section 33 override in cases w h ere th e judiciary h as
n ullified legislation on Ch arter groun ds.242
In such
circum stances, th e legislature m ay con sider th e view s of th e
judiciary, w h ile at th e sam e m akin g its ow n prin cipled
assessm en t about h ow th e rights in question sh ould best be
protected.
Alth ough Hiebert ties h er account of dialogue to th e
Can adian Ch arter, there is n o reason w hy th is w ay of
un derstan din g institution al in teractions can n ot be exten ded to
oth er n ations, in cludin g th e Un ited States, because the positive
features of th e judicial an d legislative processes th at she
describes w ill be closely an alogous in m ost con stitution al
system s. In th e Un ited States, th e fact that th e political
bran ch es of govern m ent appear before th e Suprem e Court in
con stitution al cases an d can respond to judicial decisions w ith
w h ich they disagree in a variety of w ays h igh ligh ts th at th e
poten tial for th e differen t bran ch es to en gage in a productive
partn ersh ip exists in this system . As a result, th e partn ersh ip
m odel dem onstrates that th e potential exists for in stitution al
“con versations occurring in both directions,” w h ich h ave th e
poten tial to “ratch et up” th e degree and quality of th e scrutin y
th at is brought to bear on th e con sideration of h ow legislative
actions im pact con stitution al righ ts.243
Com pared to th eories discussed previously w h ich refer
to a special dialogic role for th e judiciary in relation to m atters
of principle, th e in stitution ally distin ct roles of th e judiciary in
partn ersh ip w ith th e legislature th at Hiebert proposes are
som ew h at m ore m odest. How ever, th ey are also m ore realistic,
given th at th ey are based on positive features of th e judicial
an d legislative processes. In addition, th ey recogn ize th at th e
241

HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS, supra note $9, at 50-51.
Hiebert considers th at the override should on ly be used follow in g a
decision by th e coun try’s h igh est court, as otherw ise th e Suprem e Court’s con tribution
w ould be om itted from constitution al deliberation s. Id. at $3. Th is view about
con fin in g the use of the override to situation s in w h ich th e Suprem e Court h as h ad an
opportun ity to speak is sh ared by oth er com m en tators. See, e.g., ROACH, THE SUPREME
COURT ON TRIAL, supra note 4, 28$-87; Kah an a, The N otw ithstanding M echanism ,
supra note 34.
243
Hiebert, Parliam ent and R ights, supra n ote 53, at 239 (“The Ch arter’s
virtue lies in its capacity to ‘ratch et up’ th e quality of scrutin y th at is brough t to bear
on th e validity of governm en tal action , n ot in its prom ise for judicial resolution of
legislative con flicts in volvin g righ ts.”).
242
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judiciary h as an im portan t adjudicative function to perform in
disputes about righ ts, but refuse to m ake em pirically
question able assum ption s244 about th e m oral superiority of the
judicial process.245
Th is accoun t also offers a un ique w ay of overcom in g th e
coun term ajoritarian difficulty at th e institution al level, due to
th e fact th at it does n ot privilege th e judicial role in
con stitution al dialogue an d leaves sufficien t space for th e
political branch es to w ork out dem ocratic resolutions to
con stitution al issues. Th is is, h ow ever, a prescriptive vision of
h ow dialogue sh ould proceed, albeit on e w h ich is firm ly
groun ded in th e positive features of th e con stitution al system .
As a result, th ere rem ain s som e risk th at legislatures m ay n ot
be able to fully live up to th eir dialogic role in practice, an d
m ay in stead gradually com e to defer to judicial
pron oun cem en ts about con stitution al m ean ing over tim e. As
observed previously in relation to process-cen tered rules,
legislatures m ay en coun ter substan tial difficulty in revisitin g
earlier decisions due to th e practical realities an d tim e
con strain ts in h eren t in th e legislative process.24$ Furth erm ore,
Hiebert h erself in creasin gly questions w heth er th is vision of
con stitution al dialogue is fully ach ievable in Can ada, despite
th e existen ce of express in stitution al m ech an ism s such as th e
section 33 override, because the political culture in Can ada
does n ot fully accept the legitim acy of political judgm en ts about
righ ts th at differ from judicial interpretation s.247 Th erefore, if
th is vision of con stitution al dialogue is to becom e a com plete
reality, it w ill be n ecessary to thin k about h ow w ays to
structure the political bran ch es, or th e rules un der w h ich th ey
operate, to en h an ce th eir abilities to participate in th e
resolution of constitution al issues.
On the n orm ative level, the partn ersh ip conception of
con stitution al dialogue is w orth pursuin g because it provides
on e of th e m ore satisfyin g accoun ts of th e dialogic judicial role
th at w e h ave en countered th us far. Of particular im portan ce,
it proposes a special an d valuable judicial role, w h ich
recogn izes th at judges m ake un ique in stitution al con tributions
to dialogue in in dividual cases as a result of th e un ique
244

See supra notes 53-57, 141-150 an d accom pan yin g text.
Cf. supra Part III.B.2.
24$
See supra Part II.A.2.
247
See Hiebert, N ew Constitutional Ideas, supra n ote 230 (discussin g th is
problem in relation to both Can ada an d the Un ited Kin gdom ).
245
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features of th e adjudicative process. Th is con ception of th e
judicial role also en sures th at th e judiciary’s con tribution s are
n ot privileged over the distin ct dialogic contributions th at
legislatures are able to m ake. How ever, th is vision of dialogue
also rem ains in com plete because it restricts its focus to form s
of in stitution al dialogue betw een th e bran ch es of govern m en t.
Th e in com pleten ess that exists here is th e con verse of th at
iden tified in relation to th e equilibrium m odel, w h ich directed
greater attention to the society-w ide aspects of dialogue. As
observed in relation to th at m odel, w e n eed to exam in e both the
in stitution al and broader society-w ide aspects of constitution al
dialogue in order to ach ieve th e m ost n orm atively satisfyin g
un derstan din g of the role of judicial review in m odern society.
Th is suggests th at a syn th esis betw een th ese m ost prom isin g
in stitution al an d society-w ide accoun ts of con stitution al
dialogue is th e best w ay to proceed w ith th e dialogic project.
IV.

DIALOGIC FUSION

Th e m ost prom isin g vision of con stitution al dialogue,
an d, con sequen tly, th e stron gest n orm ative accoun t of the role
of judicial review in m odern con stitution alism em erge w h en th e
equilibrium an d partnersh ip un derstan din gs of dialogue are
com bin ed. On th e on e h an d, th is syn th esis h elps resolve
lin gerin g dem ocratic legitim acy con cern s w ith th e partnership
m odel.248 More im portan tly, th is dual-track vision en ables a
m ore com preh en sive un derstandin g of th e differen t
in stitution al an d social aspects of constitutional dialogue, an d
of th e various un ique w ays in w h ich different actors participate
in th e search for constitution al m ean in g.
Th e value of in corporatin g th e equilibrium accoun t in to
a com preh ensive understandin g of con stitution al dialogue
results from its con ception of the judicial role as on e of
facilitatin g an d fostering society-w ide con stitution al discussion
an d debate. As w e have seen , th is accoun t h as sign ificant
n orm ative prom ise because it enables us to un derstan d h ow
m ore en durin g an d w idely accepted an sw ers can em erge
th rough th e process of society-w ide con stitution al discussion.
Th e equilibrium account is also valuable due to its inclusion of
th e people as dialogic partn ers an d its recogn ition of th e
im portan ce of in volving th e citizen ry in on goin g debate about
248

See supra notes 204-205 an d accom panyin g text.
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con stitution al m ean in g an d ch an ge w ith in society. Despite
th ese positive features, h ow ever, the equilibrium account does
n ot succeed com pletely in resolvin g th e counterm ajoritarian
con cerns associated w ith judicial review , given th at cases of
relatively low political salien ce are unlikely to en gage societyw ide discussion . In addition, th e account rem ain s in com plete
because it can n ot explain fully th e in stitution al aspects of
con stitution al dialogue.
Th ese lin gerin g difficulties w ith th e equilibrium m odel
are overcom e by syn th esizin g its un derstandin g of dialogue
w ith th at en com passed in th e partn ersh ip m odel. As discussed
in th e previous Part, th e partn ersh ip accoun t of dialogue
proposes th at judges an d legislatures brin g un ique
in stitution al perspectives to th e con sideration of con stitution al
m ean in g due to th eir “separate yet in tercon n ected” positions in
th e constitution al order. If th e bran ch es listen an d learn from
on e an oth er’s differin g perspectives on constitution al m ean in g,
th en better answ ers w ill be arrived at in in dividual cases. Th e
dyn am ic fusion of th ese tw o un derstandin gs h igh ligh ts th at
judges can both facilitate con stitution al discussion at a societyw ide level an d m ake un ique in stitution al con tributions to th e
con sideration of con stitution al values in th e context of
in dividual cases. In turn , judges can also respon d dialogically
at th e level of in dividual cases to th e distin ctive con tributions
of the legislature in relation to constitution al m ean in g, an d to
th e developin g view s of broader constitution al culture. On th is
dual-track un derstan din g of constitution al dialogue, th ere are
tw o distin ct aspects to th e role of judicial review in m odern
society. First, judicial review assists in th e production of m ore
durable an d w idely accepted answ ers to con stitution al issues
th at en gage society as a w h ole. Second, judicial review also
aids th e im proved institution al resolution of constitution al
questions at th e level of in dividual cases, due to th e unique
perspectives provided by judges an d th e political bran ches of
govern m en t in dialogue w ith on e an oth er. In turn , th ese in terbran ch in teractions also form part of an y society-w ide dialogue
th at takes place. In th e con text of pervasive yet reason able
disagreem en t about th e m ean in g of righ ts, th is com bin ed
un derstan din g offers th e best ch ance of producin g an sw ers to
con stitution al questions th at are n ot on ly satisfyin g in th e
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con text of the resolution of in dividual cases, but w h ich are also
satisfyin g to th e citizenry as a w h ole.249
Th is n ovel w ay of understan din g th e role of judicial
review open s a n um ber of aven ues for future research in th e
field of constitution al th eory. Th e prin cipal area of in quiry
th at should be pursued relates to h ow w e m ight foster both th e
in stitution al and th e broader social aspects of th is vision of
dialogue w ith in th e United States an d abroad. In relation to
th e society-w ide aspects of con stitution al discussion , it rem ains
im portan t in th e Un ited States to th ink about practical
strategies th at w ill enable th e view s of th e citizen ry to be
in corporated m ore com pletely into constitution al dialogue, due
to th e evidence of grow in g civic disen gagem ent.250 Outside the
Un ited States, th e exten t to w h ich th e judiciary actually
facilitates society-w ide debate is un certain in m an y n ations,
due to the lack of positive eviden ce about th ese issues. In
relation to th ose system s, it w ill first be im portan t to exam in e
th e exten t to w h ich these broad dialogic dynam ics currently
exist, before begin n in g to th in k about the best w ays to m odify
or adapt th ese system s in order to in corporate m ore com pletely
th e judicial role of facilitatin g broader con stitution al
discussion .251
In relation to th e in stitution al aspects of con stitution al
dialogue, w e n eed to con sider in furth er detail th e ran ge of
in stitution ally distin ct con tributions th at th e judicial an d
legislative bran ch es brin g to th e dialogue. On ce th is is don e,
w e sh ould also con sider w ays in w h ich th ese differen t
con tribution s can best be h arn essed in order to facilitate a
greater degree of institution al dialogue as partn ersh ip. In th is
regard and draw in g on Hiebert’s description , w e can propose a
broader ran ge of institution ally distin ct con tribution s that th e
judicial and legislative bran ch es are able to brin g to th e process
of con stitution al dialogue.
Th e legislative bran ch h as distin ct advantages in
in stitution al dialogue in dealin g w ith polycen tric issues an d in
con siderin g h ow to balan ce th e pursuit of policy objectives w ith

249
Cf. Wh ittin gton , E xtrajudicialConstitutionalInterpretation, supra n ote 53,
at 84$ (“In th e con text of reasonable disagreem en t, it seem s appropriate to allow broad
participation in the decision as to the content of our principles rath er th an rem ove th at
decision to an elite institution th at w ill then seek to im pose its rulin g on , or again st,
th e people at large.”).
250
See supra Part III.B.3.
251
See supra notes 207-208.
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th e recogn ition an d protection of con stitutional righ ts.252 Th e
com parative ability of legislatures to m ake th ese judgm ents
rests on th e superior fact-gath erin g capabilities an d specialized
policy expertise of th e political bran ch es. Th ese capabilities
also m ean th at legislatures are able to act positively to protect
righ ts and to experim en t w ith righ ts protection an d
en forcem ent in w ays that exten d beyon d th e rem edial pow er of
th e judiciary.253 In sh ort, legislatures h ave distin ct advan tages
in con siderin g h ow th e protection an d interpretation of
con stitution al rights fits in to th e “big picture” of political
decision -m akin g for th e ben efit of society as a w h ole.
Th is broad focus n on eth eless m ean s th at th e in dividual
effects of legislation m ay n ot alw ays be readily apparent in th e
draftin g process. It is also un likely th at legislatures w ill focus
on th e in dividual effects of statutes to an y sign ifican t extent
due to th e fact th at m odern legislation ten ds to be en acted in
open -ended an d gen eral term s.
As Victor Ferreres h as
observed, th is can be traced to th e fact th at it is in creasin gly
difficult to ach ieve consen sus around specific rules as a result
of in cen tives for legislative com prom ise an d decision -m akin g by
votin g.254 In th ese circum stances, th e judiciary perform s an
im portan t im plem entation fun ction by con siderin g th e concrete
con sequences of statutes in th e con text of th e facts of particular
cases. In so doin g, th e judiciary is able to h igh ligh t th e
in dividualized effects of legislation th at m ay h ave gon e
un observed by th e legislature. Th e judiciary th erefore h as a
com parative advan tage in bein g able to h igh ligh t th e “sm all
picture” regardin g th e legal or con stitution al con sequences of
legislation in specific cases.255
Th e judiciary also perform s a special in stitution al
fun ction due to its com parative tem poral advan tage in
252

See generally Lon L. Fuller, The Xorm s and Lim its of Adjudication, 92
HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978) (discussin g the n ature of polycen tric in quiries).
253
Post an d Siegel recogn ize th at Con gress can establish com prehen sive
regulatory an d adm in istrative sch em es to enh an ce th e protection of con stitution al
righ ts, w h ich go beyon d th e boun ds of the rem edial pow er of th e judiciary. See Post &
Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism , supra note 184, at 2007.
254
See Victor Ferreres Com ella, The E uropean M odelofConstitutionalR eview
of Legislation: Tow ard D ecentralization?, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 4$1, 471-72 (2004); see
also id. at 472 (regardin g the judiciary fittin g “th e pragm atic needs of m odern society”).
255
Cf. Wh ittin gton , E xtrajudicialConstitutionalInterpretation, supra n ote 53,
at 84$ (suggestin g th at “[t]h e judiciary’s m ost useful role m ay be in fram in g
con stitution al disputes for extrajudicial resolution an d in en forcin g the prin cipled
decision s reached elsew h ere rath er th an in autonom ously an d auth oritatively defin in g
con stitution al m ean in g”).
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en surin g th at sufficien t atten tion is paid to con stitution al
values. As previously observed, w h ile recogn izin g th at
legislatures are m otivated and com peten t to en gage in
con stitution al in terpretation, th e reality of th e legislative
process m ean s th at legislators m ay not alw ays h ave sufficien t
tim e to devote to com plete con stitution al exegesis on every
issue.25$ Legislators h ave a variety of roles to perform in
addition to th eir fun ction of en actin g legislation , such as party
fun ctions, m eetin g w ith constituen ts, an d overseein g
govern m en t adm inistration , w h ich m ay som etim es draw them
aw ay from core legislatin g.257 Furth erm ore, the legislature’s
n eed to confront seem ingly urgen t issues m ay som etim es result
in h astily en acted law s, w ith out sufficient atten tion paid to
m easures th at m ay un duly restrict righ ts.
With out
succum bin g to gen eralized fears about legislative expedien cy
an d self-in terest, judges can h elp en sure th at sufficient
legislative atten tion is paid to constitution al values. Judges
are able to assist in th is w ay because th ey often h ave m ore
tim e to devote to th is task w ith out th e im m ediate pressure of
con flictin g in cen tives in th e con text of th eir dispute resolution
fun ction.258 In com m on law system s, th e judiciary’s ability to
m ake th is contribution is bolstered by procedures, such as
certiorari an d th e ability to avoid con stitution al questions
w h ere ordin ary legal groun ds of decision are available, w h ich
en able th e Court to decide w h ich, an d h ow m any, constitution al
cases it w ill focus on in detail.259
25$

See supra Part III.A.2.
See, e.g., Keith E. Wh ittin gton, A n “Indispensable Xeature”?
Constitutionalism and Judicial R eview , $ N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 27 (2002)
(“Legislators h ave m ultiple roles to fulfill, in addition to m akin g law , th at in clude
overseein g govern m en t adm in istration an d servin g constituen ts. As a con sequen ce,
th e legislature m ay not alw ays give sufficien t atten tion to particular con cern s such as
civil liberties. In passin g specific law s, th erefore, it m ay m ake sen se for courts to in sist
on som e further dem on stration from legislatures th at they h ave perform ed th eir
legislative role properly . . . .”).
258
Jan et Hiebert focuses on th is issue in developin g her relation al approach,
arguin g th at judicial decision s can legitim ately encourage legislatures “to give m ore
sen sitivity an d th ough t” to h ow th ey propose to accom plish legislative objectives. See
HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS, supra n ote $9, at 70-71. In essence, th is approach
in volves the use of process-centered rules, such as th ose discussed in Part III.A.2.
Ideally, w h en th in kin g about in stitution al design , w e m igh t w an t to structure a system
so th at the ch ances of legislative h aste or th ough tlessness are m in im ized. To the
exten t th at th is is not possible, how ever, som e utility in process-cen tered rules un der a
structural un derstan din g of con stitution al dialogue m ay rem ain .
259
See generally Victor Ferreres Com ella, The Consequences of Centralizing
Judicial R eview in a Special Court: Som e Thoughts on Judicial A ctivism , 82 TEX . L.
REV. 1705 (2004).
257
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With th ese in stitution ally distinct roles in m in d, furth er
research sh ould be un dertaken in order to un derstand h ow best
to design or structure in stitutions in order to foster
in stitution al dialogue
groun ded
in
th ese
differin g
con tribution s. In m an y n ation al settin gs, includin g th e Un ited
States, th is could be ach ieved by m odifyin g the rules through
w h ich th e operation s of th e judiciary an d th e political branch es
are arran ged.2$0 In oth er coun tries, th is m igh t also in volve
aspects of constitution al design to broaden th e aven ues
th rough w h ich th e judiciary an d th e political bran ch es listen to
an d learn from each other’s un ique perspectives.2$1
Th ere are th us a h ost of issues th at require furth er
con sideration in order to en able th is broader dual-track vision
of constitution al dialogue to be realized m ore com pletely in
con stitution al system s aroun d th e globe. Resolvin g th ese
questions of in stitutional ch oice is com plex, and w ill ultim ately
require fact-specific an d n ation-specific in quiries in to h ow
in stitution al arran gem en ts operate in differen t constitution al
settin gs.2$2 Th is research agen da is, h ow ever, w ell w orth
pursuin g, n ot on ly because a broader understan din g of
con stitution al dialogue th at en com passes both in stitution al
an d society-w ide aspects is m ore n orm atively attractive th an
an y oth er un derstan din g of dialogue previously exam in ed, but
also because it provides th e stron gest justification for the role
of judicial review in dem ocratic constitution alism .
V.

CONCLUSION

Th eories of constitution al dialogue m ake im portan t
con tribution s to our un derstan din g of judicial review . Th is
article h as revealed, how ever, th at th ere is a great degree of
2$0

See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Verm eule, Institutional D esign of a
Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1278 (2001) (exam in in g how th e rules th at
structure con gression al operation s can be m odified to produce “th e righ t quan tity an d
quality of con gression al deliberation on con stitution al question s”).
2$1
For exam ple, th is option is possible in Australia w here debate con tin ues
about the possible design of a federal con stitution al or statutory bill of rights. See
generally GEORGE WILLIAMS, THE CASE FOR AN AUSTRALIAN BILL OF RIGHTS (2004). In
a differen t con text, th e issue of broad con stitution al reform is bein g pressed in the
Un ited Kin gdom , in cluding the creation of a new Suprem e Court. See, e.g., BUILDING
THE UK’S NEW SUPREME COURT: NATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (An drew
Le Sueur ed., Oxford Un iversity Press 2004).
2$2
McDon ald, supra note 158, at 25; Adrian Verm eule, Judicial R eview and
InstitutionalChoice, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2002) (arguin g th at one of the
dilem m as of in stitution al choice is th at “w e can’t assess judicial review w ithout
an sw erin g questions th at w e lack the in form ation to an sw er”).
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varian ce in th e exten t to w h ich th eories of dialogue are able to
resolve coun term ajoritarian concerns an d provide an attractive
n orm ative vision of the role of judicial review in dem ocratic
con stitution alism . In broad term s, w e h ave seen th at positive
th eories ten d to h ave th e greatest success respondin g to
dem ocratic legitim acy con cern s, due to th e fact th at th ey
h igh ligh t th e ability of th e political branch es of govern m en t
an d oth er social actors to respond to judicial decision s in th e
even t of disagreem en t. More prescriptive theories, in con trast,
are gen erally less successful in resolvin g th ese con cerns as they
ten d to privilege th e judicial role in con stitution al decisionm akin g, w ith out adequate reason, and leave in sufficient space
for indepen den t political judgm en t about con stitution al
m ean in g.
Th e success of th e differen t th eories in providin g a
satisfyin g n orm ative vision of constitution al dialogue is also
m ixed. Th eories of judicial m eth od, w h ich are th e m ost
stron gly prescriptive, are m ost susceptible to n orm ative failure
because th eir prescription s for judicial action are too far
rem oved from how judicial review operates in th e real w orld.
Con versely, structural th eories of dialogue, w h ich h ave firm er
positive foundations, are m ost likely to fall norm atively sh ort
in relation to providin g a satisfyin g justification for th e role of
courts in dialogic judicial review .
In ligh t of th ese difficulties, the greatest poten tial for
ach ievin g a n orm atively satisfyin g un derstan din g of
con stitution al dialogue em erges th rough th e dyn am ic fusion of
th e equilibrium an d partn ersh ip m odels of dialogue. As w e
h ave seen , equilibrium th eories focus on th e role of th e
judiciary
in
facilitatin g
an d
fostering
society-w ide
con stitution al discussion , w h ile partn ersh ip m odels draw
atten tion to m ore distin ct institution al function s th at th e
judicial an d legislative bran ch es perform in dialogue w ith on e
an oth er. Th e syn thesis of these un derstandin gs h igh ligh ts th at
dialogue should ideally in corporate both society-w ide an d
in stitution al aspects.
Most im portantly, th is dual-track
un derstan din g of dialogue provides th e stron gest n orm ative
vision of th e role of judicial review
in m odern
con stitution alism , an d also th e greatest possibility for
design in g im proved con stitution al system s that can truly live
up to th e dialogic prom ise. Th e ch allen ge th at rem ain s for
con stitution al th eorists is to thin k of creative design
m ech an ism s th at w ill en able th is vision of dialogue to be m ore
fully ach ieved in con stitution al system s th rough out th e w orld.

